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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from the petition of Paul C. Burke for an 
extraordinary writ filed pursuant to Rule 65B(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Mr. Burke seeks review of a court order by Judge Leslie Lewis 
of the Third Judicial District Court appointing Mr. Burke as replacement 
counsel to represent the interests of a presently absent defendant in a 
pending civil action. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2 (2) to issue extraordinary writs. Jurisdiction is also proper because 
this Court possesses appellate jurisdiction, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)(k), over interlocutory appeals of orders from a district court. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Does the District Court have the discretion to appoint 
replacement counsel to represent a missing defendant physician in a civil 
action where an insurance company seeks to retroactively invalidate that 
defendant's malpractice insurance coverage in order to avoid satisfying an 
outstanding judgment of an innocent injured third-party claimant? 
2. Would it constitute a violation of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct for appointed replacement counsel to comply with the 
1 
order of the District Court and assume representation of a presently absent 
defendant with whom counsel has been unable to communicate? 
SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Since the present review stems from a petition for an extraordinary 
writ under Rule 65B(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court's 
review "shall extend no further than to determine whether the [District 
Court] has regularly pursued its authority." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(4). 
"An extraordinary writ is not a proceeding for general review, and cannot 
be used as such." Anderson v. Baker, 296 P.2d 283, 285 (Utah 1956). 
Under Rule 65B, extraordinary relief may be granted "to right 'the 
wrongful use of judicial authority [or] the failure to exercise such 
authority.'" Osborne v. Adoption Ctr. of Choice, 70 P.3d 58, 63 (Utah 
2003) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a)). In reviewing the exercise of judicial 
authority, Rule 65B(d) provides that relief may be granted where an inferior 
court "exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion." Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B(d)(2)(A). "'Abuse of discretion5 for rule 65B(d) writs must be much 
more blatant than the garden variety 'abuse of discretion' featured in 
routine appellate review." Utah County v. Alexanderson, 71 P.3d 621, 623 
(Utah App. 2003) (emphasis added) see also Addendum C; also Osborne at 
2 
63; State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 922 (Utah App. 1998) (holding Rule 
65B(d) writ requires "egregious and momentous legal error") see also 
Addendum D; Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 
1995)). Thus, the Trial Court's appointment of replacement counsel will be 
vacated only if it is a "gross and flagrant" abuse of judicial discretion. 
Alexanderson at 623. 
In its brief, The Doctors' Company (hereinafter "TDC") raises 
several peripheral and factual issues underlying the District Court's 
appointment of replacement counsel which Real Party in Interest Athan 
Montgomery (hereinafter "Montgomery") does not believe are properly 
before this Court, but which Montgomery is thereby compelled to address 
at least summarily. See Osborne at 63 (Matters not addressed in Rule 
65B(d) petition but raised in appellee brief only "cloud the issue" and are 
not properly before the Court.). Consequently, to the extent the District 
Court has made certain factual findings as a predicate to the order 
appointing replacement counsel that is the subject of this review, those 
factually based determinations will not be upset on appeal unless they are 
3 
"clearly erroneous."1 Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). It is not within an appellate 
court's authority to review de novo the factual underpinnings of a trial 
court's orders. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
With regards to the issue of whether appointed replacement 
counsel's compliance with the order of the District Court could somehow 
constitute a violation of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, that is a 
determination reviewed for correctness in light of this Court's "special 
interest in the administration of the Rules of Professional Conduct." See 
Spratlev v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 78 P.3d 603, 607 (Utah 2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The present appeal springs from the ongoing legal maneuvers of The 
Doctors' Company, which seeks to retroactively invalidate the professional 
liability insurance policy it issued to Dr. G. Gregory Drezga (hereinafter 
"Dr. Drezga") in order to avoid satisfying an outstanding jury verdict in 
favor of young Athan Montgomery, a small child that sustained severe and 
1
 An appellate court shall review any underlying factual findings under a 
"clearly erroneous" standard. Utah County v. Alexanderson, 71 P.3d 621, 623 
(Utah App. 2003). 
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permanently debilitating injuries, including brain damage and paralysis, as 
the result of the medical malpractice of Dr. Drezga. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Attorney Paul C. Burke filed a petition for an extraordinary writ 
seeking this Court's guidance and review after being appointed by Judge 
Leslie Lewis of the Third Judicial District Court to assume the legal 
representation of Dr. Drezga's interests following the sudden withdrawal of 
the defense attorney that TDC originally hired and arranged to appear in 
court and accept service on Dr. Drezga's behalf, and whose participation in 
this case facilitated TDC's earlier bid for summary judgment. When Judge 
Lewis subsequently denied TDC's motion for summary judgment in its 
entirety, and it became apparent that TDC's interests would be better served 
if Dr. Drezga was left without any legal representation, the TDC-affiliated 
counsel ostensibly defending Dr. Drezga conveniently stepped aside and 
TDC promptly tried to obtain a default judgment against the absent and 
now unrepresented Dr. Drezga. 
Alarmed at the maneuverings playing out in Dr. Drezga's absence, 
co-defendant, baby Athan Montgomery, filed a motion asking the court to 
appoint replacement counsel to represent Dr. Drezga. Judge Lewis agreed, 
5 
and Mr. Burke was eventually appointed as replacement counsel for Dr. 
Drezga. 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to clarify the present relative 
positions of the parties to this action regarding the issues now on appeal. 
Although this Court's Order of July 27, 2004 states that, "[I]t appears . . . 
The Doctor's Company's position is aligned with Petitioner's", 
Montgomery believes that the interests of TDC and Mr. Burke are, in fact, 
largely incongruous. 
Real Party in Interest TDC stridently seeks to prevent Dr. Drezga 
from having any legal representation in this matter and asserts that the 
District Court was without authority to provide replacement counsel for 
Drezga following the departure of his TDC-affiliated lawyer when TDC's 
bid for summary judgment was denied. TDC also claims that it would now 
be somehow unethical for Mr. Burke, to step in as replacement counsel and 
represent Dr. Drezga's interests. 
Real Party in Interest Montgomery, on the other hand, believes that 
under the circumstances there are sound and compelling reasons in both 
law and equity supporting the District Court's appointment of replacement 
counsel for Dr. Drezga. Montgomery also contends that compliance with 
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the District Court's order of appointment will not place Mr. Burke in any 
ethical jeopardy. 
Finally, without casting his lot with either Montgomery or TDC in 
connection with his Petition for Extraordinary Writ, appointed replacement 
counsel, Mr. Burke, has sought this Court's review of the District Court's 
authority to appoint replacement counsel for Dr. Drezga and for this 
Court's guidance as to whether his compliance with the appointment order 
places Mr. Burke in breach of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts 
1. Athan Montgomery, a newborn child, brought a claim against 
Dr. G. Gregory Drezga, a physician insured by TDC, for permanent 
injuries, including paralysis and brain damage, sustained as the result of a 
serious medical error. (R. at 1, 5-6; 1799, 47:8-9). 
2. Having refused to settle baby Athan's claims for nearly two 
years, TDC instead filed a declaratory judgment action (hereinafter 
"Declaratory Action") in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah naming 
Dr. Drezga, baby Athan Montgomery, and Athan's mother as defendants. 
The Declaratory Action was assigned to Judge Leslie Lewis and has been 
pending for nearly six years now. (R. at 1). 
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3. Through the Declaratory Action, TDC seeks judicial relief 
from its obligation to "defend and indemnify" Dr. Drezga in order to avoid 
paying compensation for the permanent injuries sustained by baby Athan. 
(R. at 5-7). 
4. In its original Complaint, the basis of TDC s Declaratory 
Action was Dr. Drezga's alleged "breach of contract" for his purported 
"refusal to cooperate." (R. at 7). 
5. After filing its Complaint, TDC filed a motion for summary 
judgment likewise alleging that Dr. Drezga had "declined to cooperate" 
with TDC (R. at 66). Judge Lewis subsequently conducted a hearing on 
TDC's motion. (R. at 1799). 
6. At that hearing, in addition to the appearance of counsel for 
parties TDC and baby Athan Montgomery, separate counsel hired and 
arranged by TDC to defend the pending malpractice action against Dr. 
Drezga likewise appeared and agreed in open court to accept service on 
behalf of Dr. Drezga in the Declaratory Action so that the hearing on 
TDC's summary judgment motion could proceed that day. (R. at 1799, 
20:8-29:19). 
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7. During the course of the hearing, TDC's lawyer, Jaryl 
Rencher (hereinafter "Rencher"), announced that The Doctor's Company 
had recently "come into information" not briefed in its initial moving 
papers, that Dr. Drezga "had not just failed to cooperate, but that he had 
intentionally and fraudulently misrepresented his claim status . . . in 
connection with [his] 1996 application for insurance coverage." (R. at 
1799,9:12-16) 
8. Mr. Rencher revealed that this previously undisclosed 
information about Dr. Drezga, "came as a total surprise" (R. at 1799, 
33:17), and consisted of "federally protected documents" (R. at 1799, 
17:22-23) that Rencher conceded TDC was "not entitled to get," (R. at 
1799, 32:19) but which were obtained and passed on to Rencher by none 
other than the TDC-affiliated counsel hired to represent Dr. Drezga. (R. at 
1799,33:19-20). 
9. In addition to disclosing federally protected information about 
his client to Mr. Rencher prior to the summary judgment hearing, Dr. 
Drezga's TDC-affiliated counsel also signed and provided to Rencher an 
affidavit in support of TDC's summary judgment motion against his client, 
Dr. Drezga. (R. at 48-49). 
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10. At the summary judgment hearing, Dr. Drezga's TDC-
affiliated counsel addressed Judge Lewis and urged her to make a "very, 
very speedy ruling on this case, on this declaratory judgment case" because, 
he remarked, "It's vital to the underlying malpractice case, and it's not 
going to prejudice anyone." (R. at 1799, 21:17-18). 
11. Apparently encouraging the District Court to expedite a 
ruling against his client, Dr. Drezga's TDC-affiliated counsel also added, 
"The facts of this case are that, in fact Dr. Drezga, my client, most likely 
lied on his application for insurance." (R. at 1799, 21:12-14; 22:9-12) 
(emphasis added). 
12. Following the hearing but prior to the District Court's 
decision on the summary judgment motion, the office of the Dr. Drezga's 
TDC-affiliated counsel formally accepted service of an Amended 
Complaint in the Declaratory Action that incorporated new allegations and 
claims against Drezga based on the federally protected information that 
Drezga's TDC-affiliated counsel had disclosed to Rencher. (R. at 477-
479). 
13. A Corrected Amended Complaint was also filed and provided 
to the TDC-affiliated counsel for Dr. Drezga. (R. at 496-508) 
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14. Judge Lewis subsequently issued a Memorandum Decision 
denying TDC's Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety. (R. at 509-
517). 
15. Judge Lewis factually found that TDC had failed to 
satisfactorily demonstrate any failure to cooperate on the part of Dr. Drezga 
and likewise ruled that TDC was not entitled to a retroactive rescission of 
Dr. Drezga's malpractice coverage for any alleged misrepresentations based 
on the information TDC had acquired from Dr. Drezga's TDC-affiliated 
lawyer since TDC's efforts to rescind were motivated by and arose only 
after learning of the malpractice involving an innocent injured third party, 
baby Athan Montgomery. (R. at 509-517). 
16. After Judge Lewis denied TDC's summary judgment motion 
against Drezga, and without filing an answer to either the Amended 
Complaint or the Corrected Amended Complaint, the defense counsel hired 
and arranged by TDC to represent Dr. Drezga for purposes of its summary 
judgment motion sent a letter to the District Court purporting to rescind his 
appearance and acceptance of service and to withdraw from the case 
leaving the missing Dr. Drezga without effective legal representation. (R. 
at 596). 
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17. With Dr. Drezga left unrepresented, TDC immediately filed a 
new motion, this time seeking a default judgment against Dr. Drezga, not 
on the Amended Complaint or the subsequently filed Corrected Amended 
Complaint, but on the superseded original Complaint. (R. at 550-564). 
18. Concerned because of TDC' s maneuverings in co-defendant 
Drezga's absence, Montgomery filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel for 
Drezga after Drezga's TDC-affiliated counsel conveniently stepped aside 
enabling TDC's default motion. (R. at 608-610). 
19. The District Court subsequently declined to grant default 
judgment against Dr. Drezga and remarked: "If the Court has already 
determined that [TDC] is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law with respect to defendant Drezga, it is questionable whether the Court 
can now enter an opposite determination in terms of a default judgment." 
(R. at 662-663). 
20. In response to Montgomery's Motion to Appoint Counsel for 
Drezga, the District Court factually found that, "[Defendant Drezga does 
not have adequate representation in this matter" and that Dr. Drezga has 
been foisted into "an adversarial position with the plaintiff, his insurer." 
The District Court then ruled that, "[T]he plaintiff is required to retain 
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independent counsel to represent defendant Drezga in this matter." (R. at 
1024-1025). 
21. TDC openly resisted the District Court's order to retain 
replacement counsel for Dr. Drezga and instead sought the intervention of 
this Court to stay the District Court's order requiring TDC to retain 
replacement counsel for Dr. Drezga, (R. at 1119), and then filed a separate 
Petition for Extraordinary Writ with this Court challenging the District 
Court's order requiring TDC to retain replacement counsel for Dr. Drezga. 
(R. at 1106). 
22. Justice Durham denied TDC's motion to stay the District 
Court's order requiring TDC to retain replacement counsel for Dr. Drezga, 
(R. at 1119), and Justice Wilkins in turn denied TDC's Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ contesting the District Court's order requiring TDC to 
retain replacement counsel for Dr. Drezga. (R. at 1121-1122). 
23. After this Court refused to take up TDC's challenge to the 
District Court's order, still defiant, TDC sought a statement from local 
attorney Michael F. Skolnick in which Mr. Skolnick opined that acting as 
replacement counsel for Dr. Drezga would violate certain provisions of the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. (R. at 1124-1126). 
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24. Armed with the "report" of Mr. Skolnick, TDC again went 
back to the District Court and asked the District Court to reconsider its 
order requiring TDC to retain replacement counsel for Dr. Drezga and 
sought yet another stay of the order. (R. at 1187-1193). 
25. Montgomery responded to this latest delay by filing a motion 
to allow Montgomery to assist the District Court in locating suitable 
replacement counsel for co-defendant Dr. Drezga. (R. at 1148-1161). 
26. TDC then sought and obtained a statement from attorney 
Charles A. Gruber whose opinion largely corresponded with that of Mr. 
Skolnick. (R. at 1228-1241). 
27. In response, Montgomery provided the District Court with the 
affidavits of Gary G. Sackett - Chairman of the Ethics Advisory Committee 
of the Utah State Bar (R. at 1296-1309) see also Addendum A, and George 
Washington University Professor Thomas D. Morgan, a preeminent scholar 
and renowned expert in the field of legal ethics. (R. at 1318-1331) see also 
Addendum B. 
28. In response to the ethical questions raised by Mr. Skolnick 
and Mr. Gruber, Ethics Advisory Committee Chairman Sackett states in his 
affidavit that under the facts and circumstances of this case the propriety of 
14 
accepting the District Court's appointment to serve a replacement counsel 
for Dr. Drezga is "not even a close call." (R. at 1300). In Chairman 
Sackett's view, a lawyer accepting an appointment to act as replacement 
counsel for Dr. Drezga would not be in violation of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct nor would he or she be subject to discipline by the 
Utah Bar's Office of Professional Conduct. (R. at 1309). 
29. Chairman Sackett criticizes Mr. Gruber's "artificial reading 
of the Rules" to prop up TDC's resistance to the appointment of 
replacement counsel for Dr. Drezga, which Chairman Sackett calls, "a 
complete perversion of the notion of [the] fair administration of justice." 
(R. at 1301). Chairman Sackett cites to the text of the Scope of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct which cautions: "The purpose of the Rules can be 
subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural 
weapons." Chairman Sackett then concludes: "The attempt to preclude 
representation of Drezga here is a 'procedural weapon.'" (R. at 1302). 
30. Professor Morgan concurs: "With respect to those taking a 
contrary position, it seems disingenuous to say that Dr. Drezga will be 
injured if he resists a lawsuit seeking to deny his insurance coverage. In 
my opinion, the Rules of Professional Conduct do not forbid protecting his 
15 
interest in retaining such insurance coverage as I understand appointed 
counsel would seek to do." (R. at 1321). 
31. In response to the affidavits of Chairman Sackett and 
Professor Morgan, Mr. Gruber prepared a reply affidavit for TDC in which 
he summarily asserts that, "[T]he opinions expressed by Mr. Sackett and 
Professor Morgan assume that there is an attorney client [sic] relationship 
already in existence at the time a client becomes absent." (R. at 1381). Mr. 
Gruber, however, provides no corroboration or specific reference to the 
affidavits of either Chairman Sackett or Professor Morgan to support that 
assertion. (R. at 1379-1389). 
32. After additional briefing by the parties and the submission of 
these competing affidavits, the District Court issued another Memorandum 
Decision denying TDC's latest motion to reconsider. (R. at 1427-1430). 
33. In that Memorandum Decision, Judge Lewis states in relevant 
part: 
The Court has now had the opportunity to carefully 
review each of these opinions in light of the relevant 
rules and case law which the parties have so arduously 
strived to find for the Court. Now being fully advised, 
the Court determines that it will not reconsider its prior 
decision to appoint counsel for defendant Drezga. The 
Court is confident that fair play and the interest of 
justice, as well as the legal reasons set forth in the 
16 
Court's prior opinions, dictate that counsel be 
appointed. (R. at 1428) see also Addendum E. 
34. Thereafter, the District Court appointed attorney Paul C. 
Burke, of the law firm of Ray Quinney & Nebeker, to represent Dr. Drezga, 
and ordered TDC to pay Mr. Burke's fees. (R. at 1505-1507) see also 
Addendum F. 
35. Mr. Rencher informed the District Court that his client, TDC, 
flatly refused to comply with the court's express orders, and that asked that 
replacement counsel be so notified. (R. at 1506). 
36. TDC, still resisting compliance with the District Court's 
orders, again came to the Supreme Court seeking interlocutory relief for the 
third time on the issue of the appointment of replacement counsel. (R. at 
1527). 
37. Like Justice Durham and Justice Wilkins before him, this 
time Justice Durrant signed an order declining to take up TDC's most 
recent challenge to the District Court's appointment of replacement counsel 
for Dr. Drezga. (R. at 1540-1542). 
38. After the District Court's Order of Appointment was served 
on Replacement Counsel Paul C. Burke and Mr. Rencher had declared that 
TDC would not comply with those orders of the District Court with which 
17 
it disagreed, Mr. Burke sought the District Court's certification for appeal 
of the order appointing him, or in the alternative to appoint him as a 
receiver for Dr. Drezga's insurance policy under Rule 66 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, or to define the scope of his appointment. (R. at 1520-
1523). 
39. The District Court elected to certify the Order of 
Appointment for appellate review (R. at 1709-1711), but the Court of 
Appeals declined to take up the matter finding that it was improperly 
certified (R. at 1771-1772). 
40. The Court of Appeals noted, however, that Mr. Burke would 
have standing under Rule 65B(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
seek clarification of the authority of the District Court to appoint him as 
replacement counsel for Dr. Drezga. (R. at 1768-1789). 
41. Mr. Burke then filed a Petition for Extraordinary Writ asking 
this Court to determine whether "Appointed Counsel has been ordered by 
the Third District Court to violate the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct" 
(R. at 1768), an inquiry essentially involving two distinct issues - the 
District Court's authority to appoint replacement counsel for Dr. Drezga 
under the circumstances, and whether compliance with an order of 
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appointment would constitute a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. (R. at 1768-1789). 
42. Justice Nehring signed an order accepting Mr. Burke's 
Petition for review by this Court, and ordered the parties to prepare briefs 
and oral arguments on the issues raised in the Petition. (Or. Granting 
Appointed Counsel's Petition (July 27, 2004)). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court, which has presided over this Declaratory Action 
for nearly six years, has inherent and equitable authority to "appoint 
counsel when the need arises" not premised on any contract or statute. The 
District Court has properly exercised that discretion in deciding to appoint 
independent replacement counsel for Dr. Drezga, after his original counsel, 
arranged by Drezga's insurer, TDC, withdrew his representation after 
having closely cooperated with TDC and supported its efforts to obtain 
summary judgment against his client. 
In the context of the Rule 65B(d) Petition of Appointed Replacement 
Counsel, TDC has applied the wrong standard of review, has sought a 
review of matters outside the scope of the review, and claims that 
notwithstanding the District Court's inherent and equitable powers, on the 
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basis of TDC s alternative interpretation of the case of Chatterton v. 
Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 1997), the appointment of counsel is improper. 
In light of the District Court's well established inherent power to 
appoint counsel to further the interests of justice, and given the stated 
purpose and basis of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, it would not 
constitute a violation of the Rules for appointed replacement counsel to 
assume representation of Dr. Drezga following the withdrawal of his 
original TDC-arranged counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TDC HAS NOT MET THE BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING 
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT'S APPOINTMENT OF 
REPLACEMENT COUNSEL FOR DR. DREZGA 
CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
UNDER RULE 65B(d). 
As a threshold matter, in the context of Mr. Burke's Petition, it is 
questionable whether TDC, which has now submitted an appellant brief in 
this matter, even has proper standing to challenge the District Court's order 
appointing replacement counsel since TDC is not the recognized petitioner 
and since this Court has already refused to afford TDC such standing on the 
several prior occasions when TDC itself sought to challenge the same 
order. TDC has, in essence, simply exploited the occasion of Mr. Burke's 
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Petition to bootstrap itself into an appellate posture that this Court has 
repeatedly denied TDC relative to the issues now before the Court. 
However, even if this Court did intend to permit TDC to present its 
opposition to the District Court's order appointing replacement counsel in 
connection with Mr. Burke's petition, Rule 65B(d) requires that a party 
challenging a trial court's exercise of judicial discretion must "demonstrate 
that the trial court committed a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion, more 
than a typical abuse of discretion featured in routine appellate review." 
Cline v. Hilder, 2004 UT App. 75. 
A. TDC applies the wrong standard of review to its challenge 
of the District Court's appointment of replacement 
counsel. 
Rule 65B(d) provides that relief may be only granted where an 
inferior court "exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(A). Since the District Court's appointment of 
replacement counsel is discretionary in nature and is the subject of a Rule 
65B(d) petition, any ostensible abuse of judicial discretion must be "much 
more blatant than the garden variety 'abuse of discretion' featured in 
routine appellate review." Alexanderson at 623 (emphasis added). 
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In Stirba, the court explained that a Rule 65B(cl) writ requires an 
"egregious and momentous" error to issue. Id. at 922 (emphasis added). 
And in both Alexanderson and Stirba, the court explains that "a simple 
mistake of law does not qualify as the kind of gross and flagrant abuse of 
discretion necessary for a rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ to issue." Alexanderson 
at 623; Stirba at 923 (emphasis added). The Utah Court of Appeals has 
even suggested that a trial court's actions would have to be tantamount to a 
violation of the petitioner's (in this case, Mr. Burke's) "substantial 
constitutional rights" to justify granting a Rule 65B(d) writ. Kvenvold v. 
Burton, 2003 UT App. 173; Kee v. Lubeck, 2003 UT App. 177. 
In its brief however, TDC suggests that within the context of a Rule 
65B(d) petition this Court should only review the District Court's order 
appointing replacement counsel "for correctness with no deference to the 
District Court's decision." See The Doctors' Company's Br. 2 (Oct. 6, 
2004). Consequently, the arguments and evidence marshaled and presented 
in TDC's brief are based on the erroneous premise of a broad-based 
"correctness" review and incorporates several ancillary issues that TDC 
claims underlie the District Courts appointment of replacement counsel and 
which TDC urges this Court to consider, presumably on a de novo basis. In 
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addition to applying the wrong standard of review, there are several issues 
for which TDC appears to be pursuing an advisory opinion that implicate 
matters not yet fully adjudicated by the District Court or which fall outside 
of the confines of Mr. Burke's petition and the scope of a Rule 65B(d)(2) 
review. 
Since TDC's arguments are improperly framed in the context of a an 
expansive "correctness" review, do not evince any violation of the 
substantial rights of Mr. Burke as the actual petitioner, and fail to observe, 
much less satisfy, the rigorous standard of review and burden of proof 
applicable to a Rule 65B(d)(2) review, the arguments that TDC has 
presented are of questionable import and usefulness to this Court and 
should therefore be disregarded. 
B. Since the District Court possesses "inherent authority to 
appoint counsel when the need arises," wholly 
independent of Chatterton v. Walker, the appointment of 
replacement counsel for Dr. Drezga is not an abuse of 
judicial discretion. 
"[I]t has always been held, regardless of express statutory authority, 
that courts of general jurisdiction have the inherent power to make and 
enforce all necessary rules and orders calculated to enforce the orderly 
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conduct of their business and secure justice between parties litigant." 
Peterson v. Evans, 188 P.2d 152, 153 (Utah 1920). 
"It is undoubtedly true that courts of general and superior 
jurisdiction possess certain inherent powers not derived from any statute. 
Among these are the power to . . . direct and control its officers, including 
attorneys." Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255, 259 (Utah 1999) (citations 
omitted). On that score, this Court explained: "The summary jurisdiction 
which [a] court has over its attorneys as officers of the court is inherent, 
continuing, and plenary." LI 
The Utah Court of Appeals has likewise expressly recognized, "the 
inherent authority of courts to appoint counsel when the need arises" - a 
power not predicated upon the existence of any statute or contract. In re 
J.D.M v. Lauritzen, 810 P.2d 494, 498 (Utah App. 1991). 
In the present Declaratory Action, through which TDC seeks to 
invalidate Dr. Drezga's insurance policy in order to avoid paying 
compensation to the injured Athan Montgomery, the District Court has 
factually concluded, "defendant Drezga does not have adequate 
representation in this matter" (R. at 1024 -1025), and has exercised its 
inherent power to appoint replacement counsel to represent Dr. Drezga. 
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The District Court, in fact, expressly invokes the equitable principles of 
"fair play and the interest of justice" when later reaffirming its decision that 
replacement counsel be appointed. (R. at 1428). While the District Court 
did not enumerate all of the specific factors giving rise to its concerns, even 
a superficial overview of the then prevailing circumstances is highly 
informative: 
The original lawyer that TDC arranged to represent Drezga arguably 
did little but prejudice Dr. Drezga while cordially cooperating with TDC. 
In addition to providing an affidavit supporting TDC's summary judgment 
motion against his own client, Drezga's original TDC-affiliated counsel 
also provided federally protected information about his client to TDC 
obtained under the pretext of representing Drezga. This information was 
then used by TDC to bolster it grounds for summary judgment. At the 
hearing on TDC's summary judgment motion, Drezga's TDC-sanctioned 
counsel appeared side-by-side with TDC's attorney, Mr. Rencher, and 
essentially urged the District Court to expeditiously grant summary 
judgment against Drezga in the Declaratory Action, if so inclined, in order 
to obviate the need for TDC and him to defend Dr. Drezga in the 
underlying malpractice action. Drezga's TDC-designated counsel then 
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accepted service of an Amended Complaint and Corrected Amended 
Complaint on behalf of Dr. Drezga which incorporated several new 
allegations based on the protected information that he had earlier provided 
to Mr. Rencher. When the Court subsequently denied TDC's summary 
judgment motion, Drezga's TDC-backed counsel conveniently stepped 
aside, without filing an answer to the Amended Complaint, so TDC could 
pursue a default judgment against the now unrepresented Dr. Drezga. In 
sum, it is certainly not at all difficult to see why the District Court might 
invoke "fair play and the interest of justice" with regard to the appointment 
of replacement counsel for Dr. Drezga in this case. 
In its brief, TDC simply looks past and does not even address the 
District Court's well established inherent and equitable powers to appoint 
replacement counsel, but instead raises the red herring of Chatterton v. 
Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 1997), which TDC suggests is somehow 
dispositive to the present review. Chatterton, however, is only indirectly 
referenced by the District Court in connection with its preliminary 
appointment of replacement counsel for Dr. Drezga following the departure 
of Drezga's original TDC-affiliated counsel. (R. at 1018). 
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In Chatterton, this Court provided guidance to trial courts on 
employing their inherent power to affirmatively curtail the types of 
complications that may arise when an insurance company undertakes 
actions in furtherance of its own self-interest that force its insureds into a 
defensive posture: "[T]he trial court can defuse these conflicts by requiring 
the insurer to furnish independent counsel." IdL at 261. Notwithstanding 
the overarching principle that this Court articulated in Chatterton, TDC's 
myopic focus on the perceived factual dissimilarities between Chatterton 
and the present case causes TDC to overstate the implications of those 
differences to the appointment of replacement counsel by the District 
Court. 
While Montgomery believes that Chatterton does in fact bolster the 
District Court's position, it simply does not constitute the District Court's 
exclusive source of authority and discretion in appointing independent 
replacement counsel. As has already been established, the District Court 
has inherent, continuing, and plenary authority "to appoint counsel when 
the need arises" In re J.D.M at 498, and to otherwise "direct and control its 
officers" Griffith at 259, in order to "secure justice between [the] parties 
litigant." Peterson at 153, 
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Additionally, on the occasion of again denying a motion by TDC to 
reconsider the appointment of replacement counsel, after this Court 
declined to entertain TDC's first round of intermediate challenges, the 
District Court made clear that its exercise of judicial discretion in 
appointing replacement counsel was not premised on a single point of case 
law, but on a broad consideration of the expert reports and affidavits 
provided by both parties, the case law and rules provided by both parties, 
and, importantly, the Court's fundamental interest in ensuring "fair play 
and the interest of justice" in this case. (R. at 1428). 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the District Court possessed 
absolutely no inherent or equitable powers with regard to the appointment 
of replacement counsel independent of Chatterton, and that the court 
misconstrued Chatterton in the very manner suggested by TDC, even then, 
in the context of a Rule 65B(d) review, the District Court's incorrect 
interpretation would still amount to nothing more than a garden variety 
"mistake of law" for which this Court will not grant an extraordinary writ, 
and not the "gross and flagrant" abuse of judicial discretion required to 
justify the issuance of such a writ. See Stirba at 923; Alexanderson at 623. 
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Furthermore, since this Court may uphold the District Court's 
appointment of replacement counsel "on any legal ground or theory 
apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that 
stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action," TDC's 
burden of demonstrating an abuse of judicial discretion after the District 
Court had factually found that Drezga was not properly represented would 
arguably appear to involve a marshaling component that TDC has failed to 
undertake. Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Utah 2002). In essence, 
TDC must list all record evidence underlying the District Court's 
appointment of replacement counsel and then demonstrate that the evidence 
is inadequate to sustain that appointment of replacement counsel. See 
generally Valcare v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). TDC has not 
done this. 
C. TDC seeks a de facto advisory opinion on certain 
substantive issues not yet adjudicated by the District 
Court and not certified for review in the context of Mr. 
Burke's Petition. 
On a petition for an extraordinary writ, this Court's review "shall 
extend no further than to determine whether the [District Court] has 
regularly pursued its authority." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(4) Additionally, 
"Courts . . . are not supposed to be a forum for hearing academic 
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contentions or rendering advisory opinions. Provo City Corp. v. 
Thompson, 86 P.3d 735, 741 (Utah 2004). 
In its brief, TDC urges this Court undertake an interpretation of 
certain provisions of the insurance contract that is the subject of the 
underlying Declaratory Action and TDC's ongoing efforts to avoid 
compensating Athan Montgomery for his injuries. TDC raises several 
questions, not certified for review in the context of Mr. Burke's Petition, 
regarding whether TDC has a contractual duty to defend Dr. Drezga under 
the provisions of the contested insurance policy (notwithstanding the earlier 
participation of counsel arranged by TDC), whether the appointment of 
counsel is tantamount to an award of attorney's fees to Dr. Drezga, and 
whether it is reasonable to determine that Dr. Drezga would want the 
assistance of replacement counsel to defend against TDC's attempts to 
invalidate his insurance coverage. 
1. TDC seeks a first impression interpretation of the 
contractual provisions it has raised on appeal. 
As this Court has stated, before an issue will be considered on 
appeal, "the trial court must be offered an opportunity to rule on [the] 
issue." Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 748 (Utah 2002) (citations omitted). 
Furthermore, as Justice Wilkins has noted, fairness dictates that the District 
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Court "should not be reversed on an issue it never considered." Justice 
Michael J. Wilkins, A "Primer" in Utah State Appellate Practice, 2000 Utah 
L. Rev. I l l , 126 (2000) (citations omitted). 
In connection with its contract arguments, TDC provides no 
evidence or citation to the record evincing the District Court's 
consideration of the contractual provisions and proposed interpretations that 
TDC now raises in its brief. Although the Declaratory Action has been 
pending for nearly six years now, the District Court has made very little 
progress towards addressing the substantive issues of this case, which 
include the contractual provisions TDC now raises. This unfortunate state 
of affairs is due largely, if not entirely, to TDC's incessant challenges, 
delays, unsuccessful intermediate appeals, and most recently, its outright 
refusal to comply with the District Court's express orders. 
Even if this Court were to undertake a first impression interpretation 
of the contractual provisions raised by TDC, it is still unclear how the 
absence of an affirmative contractual duty to defend Dr. Drezga on the part 
of TDC, if none in fact exists, would in any way vitiate the District Court's 
power to appoint replacement counsel on any of several other grounds, if 
the District Court has determined that Drezga should be represented. 
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2. TDC's argument regarding attorney's fees is 
likewise beyond the scope of this review. 
The scope and function of this review apparently continue to elude 
TDC as it next complains that the appointment of replacement counsel is 
tantamount to an award of attorney's fees to Dr. Drezga. TDC essentially 
claims that if this Court first decides to undertake an interpretation of Dr. 
Drezga's insurance contract and adopts TDC's proposed interpretation in 
the process, then the District Court's appointment of replacement counsel 
would constitute an impermissible award of attorney's fees. As far as 
Montgomery can tell, the issue of attorney's fees was likewise not certified 
as part of Mr. Burke's petition. 
As a back up position, TDC then suggests that this Court should 
follow TDC's lead and disregard the inherent and equitable powers that the 
District Court, and in the absence of some affirmative contractual or 
statutory duty binding upon TDC, should not sustain the District Court's 
orders absent some finding that TDC acted in "bad faith, fraudulently, or 
was stubbornly litigious." See The Doctors' Company's Br. at 37. 
Again, while Montgomery believes that TDC's attorney's fees 
argument is not properly before this Court on this review, and while 
Montgomery wholeheartedly subscribes to the ideals set forth by this Court 
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in the Standards of Professionalism and Civility, TDC itself has raised the 
issue of its conduct in this litigation and Montgomery is constrained to 
remark on that conduct in passing: 
As the party single-handedly responsible for dragging this litigation 
into its sixth year with virtually no progress made on resolving the 
substantive issues - as the party that has pursued multiple intermediate 
challenges to the appointment of replacement counsel in this Court, all of 
which were declined - as the party that has beleaguered the District Court 
with cumulative motions to reconsider and "re-reconsider" all current and 
previous rulings with which it is disagrees - as the party that has been 
unable to accept the decisions of this Court and the District Court without 
repackaging and resubmitting the same unmeritorious arguments time and 
again - and as the party that has now gone so far as to inform the District 
Court that it will not comply with those court orders with which it happens 
to disagree, TDC would perhaps do well not to place at issue the question 
of "bad faith and stubborn litigiousness." Indeed, a bit of sober 
introspection on the events of the past six years might not be a bad thing. 
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3. Dr. Drezga would prefer to have the assistance of 
legal counsel to protect his interests under the 
circumstances. 
TDC next finds fault in the District Court's factual determination 
that a reasonable person in the position of Dr. Drezga, whose legal rights 
and interests are under assault, would prefer to have the benefit of 
competent legal representation in the form of independent replacement 
counsel. TDC asks this Court to instead entertain a number of hypothetical 
and alternative scenarios. Once again, unconvinced that this issue is even 
properly before this Court, Montgomery must respond at least summarily 
should this Court find it useful. 
TDC's suggests to this Court that Dr. Drezga might in fact prefer not 
to have replacement counsel so he can enable TDC to obtain a default 
judgment against him, See The Doctors' Company's Br. at 37, -
correspondingly, is TDC also suggesting that Dr. Drezga would have 
supported TDC's bid obtain summary judgment against him when he was 
represented by TDC-affiliated counsel? The logic is as fascinating as it is 
dizzying. 
Applying the TDC standard to its own hypothetical, Dr. Drezga's 
interests may conceivably and fortuitously coincide with whatever TDC's 
34 
happened to be at the time. Therefore, naturally, TDC would have had no 
problem presuming that Drezga would consent to having TDC-arranged 
representation when it facilitated TDC's motion for summary judgment. 
Likewise, TDC and Dr. Drezga's original TDC-provided counsel had no 
problem presuming that Drezga would consent to his counsel obtaining and 
disclosing federally protected information to Mr. Rencher or submitting an 
affidavit in support of TDC's summary judgment motion. Drezga would 
then have presumably consented to his TDC-arranged counsel providing 
adverse testimony at the hearing on TDC's summary judgment motion, 
accepting service of an Amended Complaint and then withdrawing without 
answering the Complaint when the District Court denied the summary 
judgment motion. Leading to the present time in which, as TDC suggests 
in its brief, Drezga would no doubt be interested in doing whatever he 
could to enable TDC's back-up plan to obtain default judgment, and would 
decline having replacement counsel defend him so that baby Athan 
Montgomery might some day be compensated. 
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While the hypothesis about Dr. Drezga's singularity of purpose with 
TDC is novel and amusing, if true, it would appear to run directly afoul of 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-202 (2004), which provides: 
No insurance contract insuring against loss or damage 
through legal liability for the bodily injury or death by 
accident of any person . . . may be retroactively abrogated to 
the detriment of any third-party claimant by any agreement 
between the insurer and insured after the occurrence of any 
injury, death or damage for which the insured may be liable. 
The attempted abrogation is void, (emphasis added). 
Finally, TDC further contends that while this Court may reasonably 
presume that by purchasing a TDC insurance policy, Dr. Drezga has 
implicitly consented to being represented in absentia in the underlying 
malpractice action, but that it would be unreasonable for this Court to 
similarly presume that when TDC wants to nullify that same insurance 
policy in order to avoid compensating an innocent injured third party victim 
such as Athan Montgomery, that Dr. Drezga would want legal 
representation in that instance as well. See The Doctors' Company's Br. at 
45. Along with Judge Lewis, Montgomery respectfully disagrees. 
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IL IT WOULD NOT BE A VIOLATION OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR APPOINTED 
REPLACEMENT COUNSEL TO ASSUME 
REPRESENTATION OF DR. DREZGA IN THIS CASE. 
When TDC found it expedient for Dr. Drezga to have legal 
representation so it could pursue summary judgment in this case, without 
batting an ethical eye, TDC had counsel appear and represent Dr. Drezga. 
TDC likewise apparently felt no ethical queasiness at having Drezga's 
counsel obtain, and then turn over to TDC, federally protected documents 
which, by TDC's own admission, it was not entitled to receive and had no 
other way of acquiring. 
TDC's ethical heart apparently did not race when it sought an 
affidavit from the counsel it retained for Drezga to support of its summary 
judgment motion, or when Drezga's TDC-affiliated counsel appeared side-
by-side with TDC's at the hearing on that motion, or even when Drezga's 
TDC-arranged counsel accepted service of an Amended Complaint 
premised on the information he had procured for TDC. Nor, it seems, did 
TDC break out into an ethical cold sweat when, after the summary 
judgment motion was denied, Drezga's TDC-backed counsel conveniently 
stepped aside without answering the Amended Complaint just as TDC filed 
a motion to default Dr. Drezga. 
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When the District Court not only refused to grant a default judgment 
against the now-abandoned Dr. Drezga but instead decided that Dr. Drezga 
was in need of competent replacement counsel, TDC underwent what can 
only be described as an ethical "extreme makeover." 
Having arranged for and closely collaborated with Drezga's original 
counsel in this Declaratory Action, TDC finds itself in the awkward 
position of trying to persuade this Court that Dr. Drezga should now be 
denied competent representation and that any attorney acting as 
replacement counsel would be in ethical jeopardy. 
Finally, as a threshold matter, it seems to Montgomery, that if this 
Court determines that the District Court has not abused its judicial 
discretion in appointing replacement counsel to represent Dr. Drezga, it 
would be incongruent to then find that compliance with a rightful court 
order would constitute a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Gary G. Sackett, Chairman of the Ethics Advisory Committee of the Utah 
State Bar concurs: "If Judge Lewis has decided . . . that Drezga's interests 
are entitled to representation by counsel, then it is inconceivable to me that 
a lawyer would be in violation of any ethical duty in responding to such an 
appointment from a judicial officer." (R. at 1306). 
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A. Ethics Advisory Committee Chairman, Gary G. Sackett, 
has concluded that Mr, Burke, would not violate the Rules 
of Professional Conduct or be subject to discipline by 
virtue of representing Dr. Drezga as replacement counsel. 
Upon reviewing the factual and procedural background and 
circumstances of this case, and considering the issues raised in the 
statements of Mr. Skolnick and Mr. Gruber obtained by TDC in an effort to 
dissuade the District Court from the appointment of replacement counsel 
for Dr. Drezga, Chairman of the Ethics Advisory Committee of the Utah 
State Bar, Gary G. Sackett provided an expert affidavit in which he stated: 
"In my opinion, a lawyer who accepts an appointment to represent Drezga 
in this case will not, by that appointment alone, be in violation of the Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct." (R. at 1299-1300). 
In the statements prepared for TDC by Mr. Skolnick and Mr. 
Gruber, both essentially grapple with one fundamental question which they 
respectively cast in the light of several individual rules: Will a lawyer who 
accepts an appointment from a duly authorized judicial officer to represent 
Drezga5s interest as replacement counsel violate the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct? In response, Chairman Sackett unequivocally 
answers: "In my view, the conclusion is not even a close call. . . Judge 
Lewis's decision to proceed with the merits of the case and to provide 
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Drezga with legal representation [presents] no ethical problem for the 
appointed lawyer." Id. 
Both Skolnick and Gruber focus their criticism of the District Court 
primarily, though not exclusively, on the diminished ability of replacement 
counsel to consult and communicate with Dr. Drezga, whose status is 
presently unknown. In support of this proposition, they cite among others, 
Rules 1.2, 1.4, 1.8 and 1.14 of the Utah Rule of Professional Conduct. Id 
at 1305. Chairman Sackett responds by observing that it is irrational to 
force-fit individual rules to situations that the Rules do not contemplate, 
especially when such an application would contravene the stated scope and 
purpose of the Rules. '"[T]he purpose of the Rules can be subverted when 
they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons.' The attempt 
to preclude representation of Drezga here is a 'procedural weapon,5 and the 
position taken by Mr. Gruber is, in my opinion, fundamentally inconsistent 
with behavior that the Rules pointedly identifies as proper." Id at 1302. In 
addition, Chairman Sackett states that the technical operation of the Rules 
must yield to overarching need of courts to assure the proper administration 
of justice in a given case. Id 
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Finally, the Rules are rife with indications that some flexibility is 
contemplated in their practical application. Phrases such as "to the extent 
reasonably necessary," and "as far as reasonably possible" are employed 
throughout. See e ^ Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 1.4, 1.14. 
B. Professor Thomas D. Morgan, one of the nation's 
preeminent scholars on legal ethics, likewise believes that 
appointed replacement counsel would not face ethical 
peril in representing Dr. Drezga. 
In response to the positions taken by Mr. Skolnick and Mr. Gruber 
concerning the ostensible technical violations of certain Rules of 
Professional Conduct that appointed replacement counsel would face in 
representing Dr. Drezga, Professor Morgan refers to the guidance provided 
in the Restatement of the Law (Third): The Law Governing Lawyers, which 
tempers the application of such ethical directives against a general standard 
of "reasonableness under the circumstances." (R. at 1320). The 
circumstances of the present matter, in the estimation of both Professor 
Morgan and Chairman Sackett, are rather extraordinary and clearly fall 
outside of the typical lawyer-client framework contemplated by the Rules 
of Professional Conduct. Id 
Professor Morgan ultimately concludes: "With respect to those 
taking a contrary position, it seems disingenuous to say that Dr. Drezga will 
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be injured if he resists a lawsuit seeking to deny his insurance coverage. In 
my opinion, the Rules of Professional Conduct do not forbid protecting his 
interest in retaining such insurance coverage as I understand appointed 
counsel would seek to do." Id. at 1321. 
In light of the superior qualifications of both Chairman Sackett and 
Professor Morgan to assess the ethical considerations of the case at hand 
and whose affidavits and opinions have previously been considered by this 
Court in connection with one of TDC's earlier attempted interlocutory 
challenges to the appointment of replacement counsel, this Court can 
properly conclude that it would not constitute a violation of the Utah Rules 
of Professional Conduct to represent Dr. Drezga in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should uphold the District 
Court's order regarding the appointment of replacement counsel for Dr. 
Drezga and affirm the District Court's conclusion that replacement counsel 
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may accept the appointment of the District Court to represent Dr. Drezga 
without violating the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
DATED this ] 2 ^ day of November, 2004. 
PARKER & McCONKIE 
Jonathon T. Tichy 
Attorney for Heidi Judd and 
Athan Montgomery 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE DOCTORS COMPANY, 
V. 
G. GREGORY DREZGA, M.D. 
Plaintiff, 
,ETAL. 
Defendant. . 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
GARY G. SACKETT 
Civil No. 990904527 
Judge LESLIE LEWIS 
Qualifications 
1. I am a lawyer with the firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, P.C., 170 
South Main Street, Suite 1500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. I and licensed to practice 
law before the courts of the State of Utah, as well as before the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
for the 5th, 10th, 11th and D.C. Circuits and the United States Supreme Court. 
2. I hold a Ph.D. from the University of Southern California in Applied Mathemat-
ics (1969), and a J.D. degree form the University of Utah College of Law (1977). 
3. I am an Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Utah College of Law, 
where I have taught the "Legal Profession" course. This course is designed around a 
study of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct and is required of all law students who are candidates for a J.D. degree 
from the University of Utah. 
4. a. I am the current Chairman of the Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee of 
the Utah State Bar, a position I have held since July 1992. I have been a member of that 
Committee since 1989. I was previously a member of the Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Committee of the Utah State Bar from 1984-88, serving as its Chairman from 1986-88. 
b. The Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee ("EAOC") is responsible for 
responding to requests from the members of the Utah State Bar (and, occasionally, from 
non-lawyers) for formal opinions concerning interpretations of the Utah Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct ("Utah Rules" or "the Rules"). The authority and scope of operation of 
the EAOC are set forth in the "Rules Governing the Ethics Advisory Opinion Commit-
tee," adopted by the Utah State Bar and attached as Appendix A. Since 1992, the EAOC 
has issued approximately 100 formal opinions and a larger number of informal responses 
to requests for opinions. 
5. a. I am a member of the Utah Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, a position held since 1994. 
b. In that connection, I was the unofficial reporter for the "Report on the Mul-
tidisciplinary Practice Proposal of the Utah State Bar," filed with the Court on September 
21, 2001, and setting forth a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the "core values" 
that form the central foundation of the Utah Rules. 
6. I was a member of the Judicial Conduct Commission Confidentiality Task Force, 
1996-97. 
7. I have lectured and participated in panel discussions numerous times on legal 
ethics topics. See Appendix B for a partial listing. 
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Case Background 
8. I have based the opinions stated in this Affidavit on the following: 
a. A discussion of the factual and procedural background leading to the consid-
eration of the issue by Judge Lewis in this case with counsel for the plaintiff, Bradley 
H. Parker and James W. McConkie II. 
b. The April 12, 2002, "Report of Kipp and Christian Regarding Non-Consen-
sual Representation" in this matter. 
c. The May 24, 2002, Affidavit of Charles A. Gruber in this matter. 
d. The June 12, 2002, letter from Judge Leslie A. Lewis to counsel in this case. 
e. Relevant portions of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, opinions of the 
Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee of the Utah State Bar, and legal ethics commenta-
tors and related opinions. 
9. As I understand the relevant background leading to the current issue before the 
Court, it consists of: 
a. In Montgomery v. Drezga, No. 980905603 (3d Dist. Ct. Utah, filed June 5, 
1998) ("the first action"), a finding of medical malpractice against defendant G. Gregory 
Drezga ("Drezga"), resulted in a substantial monetary award to plaintiff Athen Mont-
gomery (a minor). 
b. Drezga was represented throughout the pendency of the first action by 
David W. Slagle, who had been appointed by The Doctors Company, Drezga's medical-
malpractice insurance carrier. 
c. During the pendency of the first action, Drezga's whereabouts were un-
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known, and Mr. Slagle represented Drezga's interests pursuant to a retainer arrangement 
with The Doctors Company. 
d. Because of Drezga's absence, Mr. Slagle conducted the defense in the first 
action without consulting with Drezga in any way. 
e. After the award in the first action, The Doctors Company filed a request for 
declaratory order in the current proceeding, seeking a declaration that The Doctors 
Company is not liable or otherwise responsible for the payment of the award in the first 
action. 
f. In response to Judge Lewis's appointment of counsel to represent Drezga's 
interests in this case, The Doctors Company has opposed the appointment of counsel on 
the grounds that any such representation would directly result in the appointed counsel's 
violation of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and, therefore, was illegal, improper 
or otherwise not within the judge's authority. 
g. There is no evidence establishing that Drezga's absence is unlawful or is 
designed to avoid civil suit, criminal prosecution or the subject matter of the current pro-
ceedings. 
h. Through counsel, Athen Montgomery seeks to uphold Judge Lewis's ap-
pointment of counsel for Drezga. 
10. In addition to the foregoing factual foundation, I have assumed that Drezga is a 
proper party in the current action and that the presiding judge has so concluded. 
Opinion 
11. In my opinion, a lawyer who accepts an appointment to represent Drezga in this 
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case will not, by that appointment alone, be in violation of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct. He will, of course, be required to carry out his duties and obligations under the 
Utah Rules to the extent possible under the constraints caused by Drezga's absence. 
12. The legal ethics issue raised by The Doctors Company in this case has not been 
directly addressed by an opinion of the Utah Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee and 
requires direct analysis of the relative roles of the Utah Rules and the legal issues that are 
the province of Judge Lewis. 
13. The first part of the analysis is to recognize the clear delineation between legal 
issues and ethical issues. Here, the underlying issue of Drezga's status as a party is a 
legal matter. Specifically, the presiding judges in both the first action and the current 
case have concluded—at least implicitly—that the lawsuits should go forward on the 
merits, notwithstanding the physical absence of Drezga, a central party to the actions. 
14. The ethical question is then framed as follows: Given (a) that Drezga is a 
proper party to the current action, (b) that he has cognizable interests in the outcome of 
the proceeding, and (c) that he cannot be located through reasonable efforts and means, 
will a lawyer who accepts an appointment from a duly authorized judicial officer to 
represent Drezga's interests violate the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct? 
15. In my view, the conclusion is not even a close call. In the absence of any 
evidence of purposeful flight to avoid the consequences of the proceedings and Judge 
Lewis's decision to proceed with the merits of the case and to provide Drezga with legal 
representation, there is no ethical problem for the appointed lawyer. 
16. In its most elemental form, the conclusion that no Utah lawyer could undertake 
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the appointment would produce a kind of Catch 22 situation in which a party's interests 
are clearly at stake,1 but the "system" won't allow for the protection of the party's inter-
ests because it's unethical. This conclusion is not consistent with the principles underly-
ing the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
17. The introductory sections of the Utah Rules provide a framework for this con-
clusion. 
a. The first two sentences under the introductory "Scope" section of the Rules 
sets the tone—particularly for unusual situations that are not addressed directly by 
the Rules or the accompanying Official Comments: "The Rules of Professional 
Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the pur-
poses of legal representation and of the law itself." (Emphasis added.) In my view, 
this principle applies to the current situation, and the artificial reading of the Rules 
set forth in Mr. Gruber's affidavit does not advance the "purposes of legal represen-
tation." To the contrary, it thwarts them. 
b. The seventh paragraph of the Scope of the Rules also points out, "Moreover, 
these Rules are not intended to govern or affect judicial application of either the 
client-lawyer or work product privilege. Those privileges were developed to pro-
mote compliance with law and fairness in litigation." (Emphasis added.) The 
judicial application here is that a lawsuit involving Dr. Drezga has gone forward and 
*Indeed, I understand that The Doctors Company has attempted or will attempt to obtain a 
default judgment in the current case—apparently because Drezga did not show up and there is no 
one to speak for his interests. In light of The Doctors Company's attempts to defeat the appointment 
of counsel to represent Drezga's interests, this strikes me as a complete perversion of the notion of 
fair administration of justice. See Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(d). 
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is proceeding on the merits. In my view, Mr. Gruber's conclusion is directly con-
trary to the principle that the Rules are designed to "promote . . . fairness in litiga-
tion." 
c. The Scope of the Rules further indicates: "Furthermore, the purpose of the 
Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural 
weapons." The attempt to preclude representation of Drezga here is a "procedural 
weapon," and the position taken by Mr. Gruber is, in my opinion, fundamentally 
inconsistent with behavior that the Rules pointedly identifies as improper. 
18. In addition, Mr. Gruber's analysis fails to consider the separation of legal issues 
from ethical issues.2 The Scope of the Utah Rules reminds lawyers that: 
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action, nor 
should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The 
Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a struc-
ture for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not 
designed to be a basis for civil liability. . . . The fact that a Rule is a just 
basis for a lawyer's self-assessment or for sanctioning a lawyer under the 
administration of a disciplinary authority does not imply that an antagonist 
in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement 
of the Rule. 
(Emphasis added.) This emphasizes that, even if there were a technical violation of the 
Rules, the tribunal may well go forward as it considers the overarching need to assure 
proper adminstration of justice.. 
2Utah State Bar ethics opinions repeatedly note the distinction between legal questions and 
ethical questions, noting that it is the function of the courts to decide those legal questions. See, 
e.g., Utah Ethics Op. 02-03, at ^ 8, http://www.utahbar.org/opinions/html/02-03.html (Utah St. Bar 
2002). Even if there is a formal violation of the conflict-of-interest rules, it does not follow that a 
lawyer will be allowed to withdraw. Namely, the presiding judicial official will make a legal 
judgment that balances the various interests involved, much as what has taken place in this case. 
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19. The Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee has addressed a related issue in 
Opinion No. 107.3 (A copy of Opinion No. 107 is provided as Attachment C.) In that 
1992 opinion, the Committee held that a lawyer who thought that a court appointment 
would involve a conflict of interest under the Rules of Professional Conduct must accept 
the appointment and pursue such avenues of legal redress as might be appropriate. The 
issue and statement of the conclusion are succinct: 
Issue: Is a lawyer subject to disciplinary action for pursuing a matter 
in which he has a conflict of interest or which may otherwise be a viola-
tion of the Rules of Professional Conduct when the lawyer has sought to 
be excused from the court appointment and the court has denied the mo-
tion? 
Opinion: A lawyer aggrieved by the necessity of accepting a court 
appointed representation under such circumstances must accept the ap-
pointment. But at the same time he or she diligently pursues the client's 
cause, a review of the trial judge's appointment may be sought. 
In the discussion of Opinion 107, the Committee noted a Tennessee case that sorted out 
the difference between legal and disciplinary jurisdictions. The analysis seems particu-
larly applicable here: 
Any other course of action [other than accepting the appointment and 
seeking review] includes the risk of sanctions or discipline. A case in 
point is the Tennessee lawyer who refused to accept an otherwise valid 
court appointment to represent a criminal defendant on the grounds that a 
state ethics opinion indicated that such acceptance would be unethical. 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the lawyer was properly held in 
contempt of court, reasoning that ethics opinions issued by the Tennessee 
Board of Professional Responsibility are not binding upon the court and do 
not have the force of law. [Citing State v. Jones in re: Larry S. Banks, 726 
S.W.2d 515 (Tenn. 1987).] 
3ht1p://www.utahbar.org/opinions/html/107.html (Utah St. Bar 1992). Utah Ethics Advisory 
Opinions are also available on Westlaw and on Utah Law on Disk, published by Lexis/Nexis. 
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Opinion No. 107 also noted: 
[I]t is unlikely that the Utah State Bar would pursue disciplinary action 
where the lawyer acted in good faith, diligently sought review from the 
trial court, and pursued whatever remedies might be appropriate before the 
Bar, through Bar Counsel, or in appellate or other courts. 
In my opinion, under that facts of current case, it is not only unlikely that the Bar's 
Office of Professional Conduct would proceed against such a lawyer, I believe that there 
would be absolutely no good-faith grounds to do so. 
20. The Utah Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules of Professional 
Conduct recently had occasion to analyze the "core values" of the legal profession. "Re-
port on the MultidiscipUnary Practice Proposal of the Utah State Bar," September 27, 
2001 ("MDP Report"). The report concludes there are three such core values (and a 
number of ancillary or related values): loyalty to clients, protection of confidential 
information, independence of professional judgment and advice. Although this report 
was oriented around a proposal that certain multidisciplinary business associations 
between lawyers and other occupations be permitted, it is relevant that the report cen-
tered on the provision of competent, confidential, loyal, professionally independent 
services to clients by members of the legal profession. 
21. In my view, Mr. Gruber's conclusions that Mr. Drezga's interests cannot be 
protected by a Utah lawyer is antithetical to the conclusions of the MDP Report. The 
importance of the MDP Report is in its recommendation that the multidisciplinary 
practice proposal be rejected as being inconsistent with the core values of the legal 
profession—a recommendation that appears to have formed the basis for the Supreme 
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Court's rejection of the MDP proposal. 
22. To conclude, as Mr. Gruber does, that those interests may not be represented by 
counsel would be an abuse of the Utah Rules and, I believe, wholly inconsistent with the 
legal and ethical framework in which the Rules are to be applied. 
23. Mr. Gruber cites the following Utah Rules and concludes that a Utah lawyer 
cannot satisfy these rules because Drezga is nowhere to be found and, therefore, the 
lawyer cannot carry out the communications suggested by these rules: 
a. Rule 1.2(a) requires that "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions con-
cerning the objectives of representation, subject to paragraphs (b), (c), (d), and shall 
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer 
shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a mat-
ter." 
b. Rule 1.4 requires that "(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed 
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information, (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary 
to enable the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." 
c. Rule 1.8(f) states: "A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing 
a client from one other than the client unless: (1) The client consents after consul-
tation " 
24. In my opinion, it is not rational—and certainly not within a "rule of reason"—to 
apply these rules to the absentee client with whom communication of instructions, 
consent and the like is not possible. The Rules were not designed to prevent a person's 
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interests from being represented if, in the opinion of a tribunal with proper authority, that 
person's interests are legally entitled to representation. If Judge Lewis has decided, as a 
matter of law, that Drezga's interests are entitled to representation by counsel, then it is 
inconceivable to me that a lawyer would be in violation of an ethical duty in responding 
to such an appointment from a judicial officer. No principle underlying the Utah Rules 
can be cited for such a proposition; indeed, the principles set forth in the Preamble and 
the Scope of the Rules are to the contrary. 
25. Relatedly, it is my view that a lawyer who accepts such an appointment would 
not be subject to prosecution by the Office of Professional Conduct or the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee, which hears cases brought by that Office, and would not be 
subject to discipline. 
26. The foregoing basic analysis that sets forth the distinction between the legal 
aspect of this case: the interests of an absentee should be protected by an appointment of 
counsel; and the ethical consideration: a lawyer who responds to a legitimate order of a 
judicial officer does not, by that act alone, engage in conduct that is in violation of the 
Utah Rules, much less that he would be subject to discipline by the Bar, and shows there 
is no ethical proscription in representing an absentee party.. 
27. Beyond the conclusions of the prior paragraph, it is also instructive to analyze 
Mr. Gruber's conclusion from the perspective of the prior representation of Drezga by 
counsel in the first action. 
28. There is no material distinction between the legality or ethical propriety of 
Drezga's representation during the first action and the current declaratory action. Both 
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situations deal with a person who, for whatever reasons, is not available but whose 
interests are at stake. 
29. As defendant in the first action, Drezga had significant interests to pro-
tect—both financial and reputational. His insurance carrier undertook responsibility for 
the representation by retaining Mr. Slagle. But Drezga was, nonetheless, Mr. Slagle's 
absentee client throughout those proceedings.4 As I understand the first action, there was 
no objection to the representation of the absentee defendant by a lawyer who could not, 
and did not, consult with the client. 
30. Mr. Gruber attempts to show that it was permissible for Mr. Slagle to represent 
an absentee client in the first action, but not in this action. In my opinion, there is no 
legal or ethical distinction in the two situations. In both, the absentee defendant has 
interests that are the subject of the action filed. In both, the tribunal has gone forward 
with proceedings that could affect the defendant's interests. In the first action, the 
propriety was apparently assumed by all the parties; in the current action, the judge has 
also proceeded with the substantive claims that affect Drezga and has not dismissed the 
case, dismissed Drezga, or otherwise eliminated his interests from consideration. Thus, 
as a matter of law, Judge Lewis has decided—at least implicitly—that the interests of 
Drezga are at issue in the current case. 
4Whether or not The Doctors Company was Mr. Slagle's client as well is not relevant here. 
As Utah Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 02-03 painstakingly discusses, Utah has not yet decided, as a 
matter of law, whether an attorney retained to represent an insured can also represent the insurance 
carrier as a client. But, in all events, the insured is always a client under these circumstances, and 
the lawyer's duty of loyalty is first to the insured. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. 02-03, at fflj 6-7, 
http://www.utahbar.org/opinions/html/02-03.html (Utah St. Bar 2002). 
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31. Mr. Gruber attempts to distinguish the situations by claiming that Drezga 
agreed, as a part of his insurance agreement, that the insurance carrier could appoint 
counsel on his behalf in the first action. But, this does not alter the fact that the condi-
tions that Mr. Gruber cites as ethical violations existed in the first action no less than 
they appear in the current case. Counsel has (had) no opportunity to consult with the 
client; has (had) no opportunity to seek approval of settlement offers; has (had) no 
opportunity to keep the client informed. That Drezga agreed that the insurance carrier 
could appoint counsel in the first action does not alter the fundamental fact that Drezga is 
the client in both situations, and Rules such as 1.2(a), 1.4(a), 1.4(b) would apply equally. 
32. Accordingly, the two cases exhibit the same analytic elements and are not 
distinguishable from a legal ethics perspective. 
33. Rule 1.14(a) also provides guidance in a case of this type: 
When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in 
connection with the representation is impaired, whether because of minor-
ity, disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reason-
ably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client. 
(Emphasis added.) Although Drezga may not be mentally disabled, "some other reason" 
has altered the normal attorney-client relationship, and the remedy is not to foreclose the 
representation, but—as guided by Rule 1.14—to recognize that there may be limitations 
to the lawyer's ability to provided "normal" representation. 
34. Finally, Mr. Gruber cites Rule 6.2(a) to support his conclusions: "A lawyer 
shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except for good 
cause, such as: (a) Representing the client is likely to result in violation of the Rules of 
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Professional Conduct." But, this is just a circular argument that assumes his conclusion 
in order to invoke Rule 6.2(a). The more salient message of the rule is the foundational 
portion: "A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a 
person except for good cause." There is no good cause here. Acceptance of the appoint-
ment is in the furtherance of the administration of justice. It involves no conflict of 
interest, no division of loyalties, no improper dissemination or sharing of confidential 
information, or any of the other aspects of representation that underpin the Rules as 
"rules of reason." 
35. For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that a lawyer who accepts the appoint-
ment to represent Dr. Drezga is not in violation of the Utah Rules of Professional Con-
duct and would not be subject to discipline by the Office of Professional Conduct. 
Dated June 24, 2002. 
Gary G. Sackett 
Subscribed to and sworn before me this^r th day of June 2002 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Carolyn S. Chrlstensen 
170 So. Main, Ste. 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
My Commission Expires 
August 25,2005 
STATE OF UTAH . 
Notary Public 
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Attachment A to ADDENDUM A 
UTAH STATE BAR 
RULES GOVERNING THE 
ETHICS ADVISORY OPINION COMMITTEE 
I. Enabling Authority. 
The Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee ("the Committee") shall be a standing 
committee of the Utah State Bar ("the Bar"). The Committee is the body designated by the 
Board of Bar Commissioners of the Utah State Bar ("the Board") to consider requests for 
advisory opinions concerning the ethical propriety of professional or personal conduct of 
Bar members and to issue and publish formal written opinions in appropriate cases. Its 
duties, authority and procedures are specifically set forth in the Rules of Procedure of the 
Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee ("the Rules"), as approved and amended from time to 
time by the Board. 
II. General Responsibility. 
Pursuant to its Rules, the Committee shall receive and respond to requests for ethics 
advisory opinions concerning Utah lawyers' ethical behavior under the Rules of Professional 
Conduct adopted by the Utah Supreme Court. 
III. Ethics Opinions and Letter Responses. 
The Committee shall respond to all requests for ethics advisory opinions either by 
issuing a formal Ethics Opinion to be published and applicable to all affected members of 
the Bar, or by issuing a Letter Response to the requesting party, as the Committee deems 
appropriate. The Committee will not issue "informal opinions," but may respond to a 
request for an ethics advisory opinion by Letter Response if, in Committee's judgment, the 
request does not warrant the issuance of a formal Ethics Opinion. 
IV. Relation to Office of Professional Conduct 
The Committee shall be independent from the Office of Professional Conduct of the 
Utah State Bar. However, the Committee's Rules shall provide that the Committee shall 
include one lawyer designated by that Office to sit as a non-voting member of the 
Committee and serve as consultant to the Committee. 
V. Binding Effect of Ethics Opinions. 
When issued and published by the Committee, an Ethics Opinion shall be binding 
on the members of the Bar and on the Office of Professional Conduct, unless the effective 
date of the Opinion is stayed by the Committee or the Board pursuant to their respective 
rules. A Utah lawyer's compliance with an Ethics Opinion shall be considered evidence of 
good-faith compliance with the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Ethics Opinions are 
binding interpretations of the Rules of Professional Conduct in matters within the Board's 
jurisdiction. 
VI. Reconsideration and Review Procedures. 
(a) Petition for Review. Ethics Opinions and Letter Responses issued by the Com-
mittee are subject to review by the Board pursuant to the procedures set forth in this Art-
icle VI. 
(i) Ethics Opinions. Within the times specified in § VI(b), any member of 
the Bar in good standing, or any other person upon a showing of good cause, may petition 
the Board for review of an Ethics Opinion issued by the Committee by filing a written 
request for reversal or modification of the Ethics Opinion or for other relief, stating the 
bases in fact, law or policy for the request. A petition for review under this provision need 
not be preceded by a request for reconsideration to the Committee. However, a recon-
sideration request is optional under the Committee's Rules and does not preclude or 
prejudice a subsequent, timely-filed petition for review to the Board. 
(ii) Letter Responses. A recipient of a Letter Response may petition the 
Board for review of the Letter Response only by first filing a request for reconsideration of 
the letter by the Committee under the Committee's Rules. Upon final disposition of the 
request for reconsideration by the Committee, the person may seek review of the Commit-
tee's action by filing with the Board a petition for review, stating the bases in fact, law or 
policy for the request and the requested relief. 
(b) Time for Review. 
(i) Ethics Opinions. Any person who seeks Board review of an Ethics Opin-
ion must file a petition for review within 30 days after the earlier of (1) the person's receipt 
of service of the Ethics Opinion or the Committee's final disposition of a request for recon-
sideration, as applicable, or (2) the last day of the last calendar month printed on the face 
of the Utah Bar Journal containing notice of the Ethics Opinion. 
(ii) Letter Responses. A recipient of a Letter Response who seeks Board 
review of a Letter Response under § VI(a)(ii) must file a petition for review within 30 days 
after the Committee's issuance of a final response to a request for reconsideration or upon 
the denial of the request for reconsideration by the expiration of time as specified in the 
Committee's Rules. 
(c) Notice of Petition for Review. Any person filing a petition for review of an 
Ethics Opinion or a Letter Response with the Board shall serve a copy of the petition on the 
Chair of the Committee. 
(d) Effect Pending Appeal. Notwithstanding the filing of a petition for review of an 
Ethics Opinion pursuant to these provisions, the Ethics Opinion shall remain in full force 
and effect for the period during which the review is pending, unless the Board, upon motion 
or sua sponte, issues a stay pending appeal. 
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(e) Procedure by Board Upon Receipt of Timely Petition for Review. Upon receipt 
of a timely petition for review of an Ethics Opinion or Letter Response, the Board, or a 
subcommittee of the Board specifically designated for such task, shall review the petition. 
The Board or subcommittee may affirm, overrule or remand the Opinion or Letter Response 
to the Ethics Advisory Committee, after conducing such procedures as it deems appropriate, 
which may, but need not, include a stay of enforcement of the Opinion, requests for 
comment from members of the Bar, amicus briefs, hearings, or any other such proceedings 
as the Board in its discretion deems appropriate. 
(f) Out-of-Time Review. A Utah lawyer in good standing who does not meet the 
time requirements of § VI(b)(i) may at any time file with the Board a petition for review of 
an Ethics Opinion that otherwise meets the requirements of § VI(a)(i). The Board will refer 
any petition for review filed under this section to the Committee for initial consideration and 
recommendation. Upon receipt of the recommendation of the Committee, the Board will 
take such action on the petition for review as it deems appropriate. 
VII. Publication and Reports to the Board 
(a) Publication. The Committee shall publish all Ethics Opinions by submitting 
official copies to (i) the Executive Director of the Bar and (ii) a person designated by the 
Executive Director, who will include the full text of the Opinions on the Bar's Internet 
website and provide a timely, prominent notice on the Bar's "home page" of the issuance 
of new opinions. The Committee shall also take reasonable steps to make the opinions 
available to other commercial and non-profit publishers of legal information. 
(b) Quarterly Summaries. No less frequently than quarterly, the Chair of the 
Committee or the Chair's designee shall give the Board a summary of the Ethics Opinions 
issued by the Committee since the last such report and any significant Letter Responses 
recently issued by the Committee or other notable Committee activity . 
(c) Annual Report. The Chair of the Committee shall submit a written annual report 
to the Board by March 1 of each year, summarizing the actions taken by the Committee in 
the previous calendar year. The report should include information concerning the number 
of requests for opinions submitted to the Committee, the number of opinions issued, the 
general issues addressed in the opinions, and a summary of other matters such as Letter 
Responses processed by the Committee. 
The foregoing Rules Governing the Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee of the Utah State 
Bar and review of that Committee's actions by the Board of Bar Commissioners were 
adopted by resolution of the Board at its meeting of January 26, 2001. 
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GARY G. SACKETT 
PARTIAL LIST OF FORMAL PRESENTATIONS ON LEGAL ETHICS ISSUES 
"Some Legal Ethics Topics That Might Have Application to 
Federal Lands-Related Practice" 
Federal Lands Law Conference, Salt Lake City, Utah 
American Law Institute-American Bar Association 
October 19,2001 
"Some Legal Ethics Topics in Title Insurance" 
National Business Institute, Salt Lake City, Utah 
September 21,2001 
"The Legal Ethics of Advising Small Businesses" 
National Business Institute, Salt Lake City, Utah 
March 21, 2001 
"Lawyers' Ex Parte Contact with Treating Physicians" 
Utah Trial Lawyers Association, Salt Lake City, Utah 
November 12,1999 
"Who Is the Corporate Client—New Rule 1.13 in Utah" 
Utah State Bar Annual Meeting, Sun Valley, Idaho 
July 1994 
"The Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Counsel" 
Utah State Bar Annual Meeting, Beaver Creek, Colorado 
June 28, 1990 
Participation in various CLE panel discussions on legal ethics issues 
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ETHICS ADVISORY OPINION COMMITTEE 
Opinion No. 107 
(Approved February 15, 1992) 
Issue: Is a lawyer subject to disciplinary action for pursuing a matter in 
which he has a conflict of interest or which may otherwise be a violation of 
Utah Bar Ethics Opinions 
116 
I15R 
115 
114 
113 
HI 
110 
108 
ifl7 the Rules of Professional Conduct when the lawyer has sought to be 
IOO excused from the court appointment and the court has denied the motion? 
99 
95 
<>I 
90 
Opinion: A lawyer aggrieved by the necessity of accepting a court 
appointed representation under such circumstances must accept the 
appointment. But at the same time he or she diligently pursues the clients 
cause, a review of the trial judge's appointment may be sought. The nature 
of that review would depend upon the nature and circumstances of the 
litigation and the gravity and seriousness of the conflict. The question of 
whether a lawyer might be disciplined, notwithstanding the court's refusal 
to grant a motion to withdraw on the basis of such conflict, must be dealt 
with on a case-by-case basis. However, it is unlikely that the Utah State 
Bar would pursue disciplinary action where the lawyer acted in good faith, 
diligently sought review from the trial court, and pursued whatever remedies 
might be appropriate before the Bar, through Bar Counsel, or in appellate or 
other courts. 
Analysis of Authority: Generally a lawyer must accept and not avoid 
court-appointed representation for indigent clients. Rule 6.2, Accepting 
Appointments, of the Rules of Professional Conduct for the Utah State Bar, 
states as follows: 
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to 
represent a person except for good cause, such as: 
(a) Representing the client is likely to result in violation of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct or other law; 
(b) Representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable 
financial burden on the lawyer; or 
l\M 
(c) The client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely 
to impair the lawyer-client relationship or the lawyer's ability to 
represent the client. 
In interpreting the ABA Model Rule 6.2, which is identical to the rule of the 
Utah State Bar dealing with accepting appointments, the courts have held: 
"Except in unusual circumstances (a lawyer) has no r ight . . . to refuse a 
case which he is requested to take by a Judge of the court for whom he 
regularly appears . . . . " -
Under both the Utah and the ABA Model Rule, a lawyer is justified in 
declining a court appointment if the lawyer has "good cause" for doing so. 
"Good cause" has been found where the appointment would likely result in 
a violation of ethics rules or other law-for example, conflicting interests 
among defendants jointly represented- or if the lawyer has insufficient 
competence;- and risk of improper use of information relating to 
representation.- Special consideration may be given for appointments to 
assist a defendant on an appeal-
Another example of "good cause" for refusing appointment is where the 
financial hardship on appointed counsel becomes prohibitively 
burdensome.-. Whether a financial burden is "unreasonable" must depend 
on the facts of each case.-
Although the Utah courts have not determined whether financial hardship on 
appointed counsel is good cause for refusing appointment, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that a failure to pay an attorney may amount to an 
unconstitutional taking of property without compensation.- In that case an 
attorney was appointed by the court pursuant to statute to represent a mental 
patient, but no provision was made for payment of that attorney. The court 
found that failure to provide a mechanism for payment of attorney's fees of 
counsel appointed by the court constitutes a taking of the attorney's property 
without giving just compensation and as such the statute was 
unconstitutional. 
The repugnance of the client or the cause to the lawyer if such repugnance 
were so compelling that it detrimentally affected representation provided by 
the appointed lawyer may also be grounds to avoid court appointment. A 
lawyer should decline to represent a client if the intensity of his personal 
feelings may impair his effective representation.-
If grounds exist to decline an appointment, the lawyer should not defy the 
order, but should seek review by appeal or other procedure.— As a practical 
matter, a request by the lawyer for an informal (or formal) review by Bar 
Counsel might be the most appropriate step to take prior to resorting to 
burdensome appellate or other extraordinary action. Such a request might 
well result in a resolution of the lawyer's dilemma or at least provide needed 
direction as to the proper course to be followed under the circumstances. 
Any other course of action includes the risk of sanctions or discipline. A 
case m point is the Tennessee lawyer who refused to accept an otherwise 
valid court appointment to represent a criminal defendant on the grounds 
that a state ethics opinion indicated that such acceptance would be 
unethical. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the lawyer was 
properly held in contempt of court, reasoning that ethics opinions issued by 
the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility are not binding upon 
the court and do not have the force of law. In that case the lawyer, whose 
partner was a county attorney, was appointed to represent a criminal 
defendant. He informed the court that he would have to decline the 
appointment based upon his reading of Tennessee Ethics Opinion 83-F-41 
barring lawyers whose law partners are county attorneys from representing 
criminal defendants being prosecuting by county officers. The trial judge 
found the conflict insufficient to prevent the appointment or to adversely 
affect the lawyer's ability to represent the defendant zealously. He found 
the lawyer in contempt, sentenced him to five days in jail, a ten dollar fine, 
and suspended the jail sentence upon payment of the fine and costs. The 
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.— 
Conclusion: Accordingly, it is the conclusion of the Committee that a 
lawyer aggrieved by the necessity of accepting an appointment to represent 
an indigent client is under obligation to the court to accept the appointment 
but at the same time he or she diligently pursues the client's cause, a review 
of the propriety of the trial judge's appointment may be sought. The lawyer 
who questions the propriety of the appointment has the burden of showing 
that the conflict exists before the court. 
Because of the unlimited potential for conflicts, this Committee cannot 
presume to anticipate the facts and circumstances of all cases that may arise 
and cannot categorically state that disciplinary action might not be taken in a 
proper case. Such would be the circumstance even though the lawyer 
pursues a motion to be relieved of the appointment based upon good cause 
as set forth in Rules of Professional Conduct 6.2. However, it is unlikely 
that the Utah State Bar would pursue disciplinary action where the lawyer 
acted in good faith, sought relief from the trial court, and pursued whatever 
remedies might be appropriate before the State Bar and in appellate or other 
courts. 
Footnotes 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE DOCTOR'S COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
G. GREGORY DREZGA, M.D., et al. 
Defendants 
REPORT OF THOMAS D MORGAN 
Civil No. 990904527 
Judge LESLIE LEWIS 
1, My name is Thomas D. Morgan. I graduated from the University of Chicago Law 
School in 1965 and I am a member of the Bar of Illinois. From 1989 to 1998, and since June 
2000,1 have been Oppenheim Professor of Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law at George 
Washington University Law School. From 1998 to 2000,1 was the Rex E. Lee Professor of Law 
at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, From 1980 to 1985,1 was Dean 
of the Emory University School of Law, and from 1985 to 1989,1 was a "Distinguished 
Professor** at Emory. From 1966 to 1980, less time for military service, I was a Professor at the 
University of Illinois College of Law. 
2. The subject of by far my most extensive teaching and scholarly research over the 
last 25 years has been the professional obligations of lawyers. I have taught courses in that 
subject one or more times each year since 1974. I have authored or co-authored numerous 
publications in that area, including the widely-used law school casebook "Professional 
Responsibility: Problems and Materials" (7th Edition 2000), published by Foundation Press, a 
1 
division of West Group. 
3. From 1986 to its publication in 2000,1 served as one of two Associate Reporters 
for the American Law Institute's "Restatement of the Law (Third): The Law Governing 
Lawyers/1 hereafter "the Restatement/' and participated actively in its research and preparation. 
From 1998-99,1 served as Associate Reporter for the American Bar Association's Commission 
on Revision of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Ethics 2000), I have also served on the 
editorial board of the ABA/BNA Lawyers1 Manual on Professional Conduct since 1984 and have 
twice served as its Chair. Attached to this report is my curriculum vitae listing, inter alia, my 
publications and professional activities. 
4. I have rendered expert opinions on questions concerning lawyers' professional 
responsibilities, standards of care, and fiduciary obligations in affidavits, depositions and 
testimony in over fifty litigated cases, and my testimony as an expert in those fields has been 
admitted in both state and federal courts, including a state court in Utah. 
5. 1 have been asked by the law firm of Parker & McConkie to respond to the 
position taken in this action by Charles A, Gruber, Esq., and Kipp & Christian, P.C., that a lawyer 
would violate the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by representing an absent client after 
appointment to do so by a court. I respectfully offer these comments as a former Utah resident, 
without compensation, for whatever help they may be. 
6. I offer no opinion on whether a Utah court has the authority to appoint counsel for 
a party and to order another party to pay for it. Assuming the court has that authority, however, 
in my opinion the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct do not forbid a lawyer to accept such an 
appointment and to carry out the representation. See the Restatement, § 14, Comment £. 
2 
7. The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct principally define conduct for which a 
lawyer may be professionally disciplined. Thus, for example, under Utah Rule 1.4, a lawyer who 
fails to keep a client "reasonably informed about the status of a matter"' may be the subject of a 
professional grievance. The lawyer might even be subject to a professional malpractice action for 
unreasonable conduct, but neither Utah Rule 1.4 nor § 20 of the Restatement says or implies that 
a lawyer may not represent a client who leaves the state or with whom communication is 
otherwise difficult or impossible. 
8. Similarly, Utah Rule 1.2 requires a lawyer to "consult with the client" regarding 
various matters and the lawyer may be professionally disciplined for a failure to do so. As § 20, 
Comment c, of the Restatement points out, however, that duty is subject to a general standard of 
"reasonableness under all the circumstances." If the client is not available for consultation, in my 
opinion a lawyer does not act unreasonably and therefore does not violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct by not consulting with the client. 
9. Utah Rule 1.14 was not written with a primary focus on absent defendants but the 
principle underlying that rule clearly applies here. Times arise when a lawyer's ability to 
communicate and consult is difficult or impossible. The "other cause" language of Utah Rule 1.14 
simply acknowledges that normal communication and consultation sometimes is not required for 
reasons other than mental disability. This case certainly seems to present such a situation. See 
the Restatement, § 24, which is consistent with this conclusion. 
10. Utah Rules 1.16,6.2 and 8.4 all forbid talcing on a matter in violation of other 
Rules of Professional Conduct, but because there is no underlying violation of Rules 1,2 and 1.4, 
the additional citations do not add anything new to the analysis. 
3 
11. With ail respect to those taking a contrary position, it seems disingenuous to say 
that Dr. Drezga will be injured if he resists a lawsuit seeking to deny his insurance coverage. In 
my opinion, the Rules of Professional Conduct do not forbid protecting his interest in retaining 
such insurance coverage as I understand appointed counsel would seek to do. 
Thomas D. Mors g*h 
Date &^*?ft ifr*l 
4 
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Utah County, Petitioner and Appellee, v. George S. Alexanderson and Charles H. 
Martin, Respondents and Appellants. 
Case No. 20020143-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2003 UTApp 153; 71 PJd 621; 474 Utah Adv. Rep. 16; 2003 Utah App. LEXIS 47 
May 22,2003, Filed 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Writ of certiorari granted 
Utah City v. Alexanderson, 2003 Utah LEXIS 111 (Utah, 
Oct. 30, 2003) 
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] Fourth District, Provo 
Department. The Honorable Fred D. Howard. 
DISPOSITION: Reversed. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Fourth District 
Court, Provo Department, Utah, granted appellee 
county's petition for an extraordinary writ under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65B, after the county argued that appellant 
deputies' employment grievances against the county were 
untimely. The trial court reversed the Utah County 
Career Service Council's decision favoring the deputies. 
The deputies appealed. 
OVERVIEW: The deputies challenged the trial court's 
reversal of the Utah County Career Service Council's 
determination that the deputies' grievance petition was 
timely. The appellate court noted that it would reverse 
the council's legal conclusion regarding its timeliness 
rule, only if it was a gross and flagrant abuse of 
discretion. The council made a factual finding that the 
deputies were not reasonably aware of their grievance 
until their December 1996 discussion with the sheriff. 
Prior to that time, the deputies did not know, and had no 
reason to know, of the possibility that they were 
personally passed over for promotion because of an 
incorrect assumption regarding their qualifications. 
Because the council had reason to believe the deputies 
were not reasonably aware of their employment 
grievance until December 1996, it did not grossly and 
flagrantly abuse its discretion in concluding, as a matter 
of law, that the grievance's date of occurrence was in 
December 1996. Therefore, the council's legal 
conclusion that the deputies' grievance was timely was 
not a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion. 
OUTCOME: The trial court's ruling was reversed, and 
the council's decision reinstated. 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Administrative Law > Judicial Review > Standards of 
Review > De Novo Review 
[HN1] The appellate court looks at the administrative 
proceeding as if the petition were brought here directly, 
even though technically it is the trial court's decision that 
is being appealed. The appellate court gives no deference 
to the trial court's initial appellate review since it was a 
review of the record, which the appellate court is just as 
capable of reviewing as the district court. 
Civil Procedure > Remedies > Extraordinary Writs 
Administrative Law > Judicial Review > Standards of 
Review > Abuse of Discretion 
Administrative Law > Judicial Review > Standards of 
Review > Clearly Erroneous Review 
[HN2] Utah R. Civ. P. 65B provides, in part, where no 
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, a 
person may petition the court for extraordinary relief 
where an administrative agency has abused its discretion. 
A rule 65B abuse of discretion hinges on whether the 
Utah County Career Service Council misused or 
exceeded its discretion. However, abuse of discretion for 
Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writs must be much more blatant than 
the garden variety abuse of discretion featured in routine 
appellate review. A simple mistake of law does not 
qualify as the kind of gross and flagrant abuse of 
discretion necessary for a Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ to 
issue. Thus, the appellate court will reverse the council's 
legal conclusion regarding its timeliness rule only if it is 
a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion. The appellate 
court reviews any underlying factual findings under a 
clearly erroneous standard. 
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Labor & Employment Law > Collective Bargaining & 
Labor Relations > Arbitration > Exhaustion of 
Remedies 
[HN3] Section VII E.l of the Utah County Office of 
Personnel Management Rules and Regulations provides, 
Any career service employee who has completed a 
probationary period having a grievance over merit 
principles may appeal to the Career Service Council. The 
employee must file a written notice with the personnel 
director within three months from the date of the 
occurrence. 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Clearly Erroneous Review 
[HN4] Although lower tribunals should make explicit 
factual findings, the failure to make factual findings is 
not reversible error where the facts in the record are 
clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment. 
COUNSEL: Tawni J. Sherman and Todd M. 
Shaughnessy, Salt Lake City, for Appellants. 
M. Cort Griffin, Provo, for Appellee. 
JUDGES: Judith M. Billings, Judge. WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Presiding Judge, James Z. Davis, 
Judge. 
OPINIONBY: Judith M. Billings 
OPINION: 
[**622] (For Official Publication) 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
[*P1] Deputies George S. Alexanderson and Charles H. 
Martin (the deputies) appeal the trial court's order 
granting Utah County's petition for an extraordinary writ 
under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
trial court found the deputies' employment grievance 
untimely and reversed the Utah County Career Service 
Council's (the Council) decision favoring the deputies. 
We reverse. 
BACKGROUND nl 
nl "We recite the facts in a light most 
favorable to the decision of the fact finder." In re 
B.S.V., 2002 UT App 343, P2, 57 P.3d 1127 
(quotations and citation omitted). Here, the fact 
finder was the Council, which ruled in favor of 
the deputies. 
[***2] 
[*P2] In 1991, the deputies were employed by the Utah 
County Sheriffs Department (the Department) as shift 
supervisors in the Utah County Jail. After a 
reclassification study, the Department eliminated all shift 
supervisor positions and opened four new sergeant 
positions, with a higher rank and pay than shift 
supervisor. Before filling the new sergeant positions, the 
Department moved the deputies and other shift 
supervisors to the lower rank of corrections specialist, 
with no reduction in pay. Because the duties of sergeant 
were similar to those of shift supervisor, and based on 
representations made to them by management, the 
deputies believed they would be promoted to sergeant. 
Both deputies requested to be considered for the sergeant 
positions. In December 1991, the Department made its 
hiring decisions, and neither deputy was promoted. 
[*P3] Although the deputies were qualified for the 
sergeant position, some of those who were promoted to 
sergeant, as the Council later found, did not meet 
minimum qualification requirements. The deputies 
suspected that several of those promoted were not 
qualified, but the deputies claim they did not have access 
to sufficient eligibility [***3] lists and did not at that 
time investigate further or pursue formal grievances. 
[*P4] Between 1992 and 1996, both deputies continued 
to express interest in obtaining sergeant positions and 
participated in testing and other evaluation procedures. 
In December 1996, the deputies learned from a sergeant 
that a lieutenant in the Department wanted him to 
manipulate the testing results involving a separate 
position within the Department. After the deputies met 
with Sheriff Bateman to discuss their concerns regarding 
promotions and evidence of corruption within the 
Department, the sheriff sent a letter to Deputy Martin 
dated December 17, 1996. In that letter, Sheriff Bateman 
stated, for the first time, that shift supervisors were not 
automatically promoted to sergeant because the position 
of shift supervisor "was never a ranked position." In fact, 
shift supervisor was a ranked position, and the deputies 
thus discovered they had possibly not been considered as 
ranked officers when applying for promotion to sergeant. 
[*P5] The deputies filed a grievance with the Council 
on January 10, 1997, challenging the sheriffs promotion 
procedures and continued failure to promote them [***4] 
to the rank of sergeant. The Council consists of three 
members appointed by Utah County's (the County) 
legislative body, see Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4(l)(a)(I) 
(2001), n2 charged with hearing employment grievances 
filed by county career service employees. See id. §17-
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33-4(l)(b). The County contended the grievance violated 
timeliness requirements from the Utah County Office of 
Personnel Management Rules and Regulations, which 
require written notice of a grievance "within three 
months from the date of occurrence." After hearing 
evidence, on June 30, 1997, the Council concluded the 
grievance petition was timely and ruled substantively in 
favor of the deputies, finding that "promotions [were] 
based on arbitrary criteria," with "inconsistent, biased 
and capricious" testing procedures. The Council 
concluded that the deputies' "discussion with Sheriff 
Bateman in December, 1996 was the date that should 
[**623] drive the time for filing." Because the deputies 
"filed within 90 days of that date," the Council reached 
the substantive issues. 
n2 In 1997, the county "legislative body" 
appointed the Council's members. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-33-4 (2001) (amendment notes). The 
2001 amendments changed this to an "executive" 
appointment. See id. 
[***5] 
[*P6] In July 1997, the County petitioned the trial court 
for an extraordinary writ under rule 65B of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, again arguing the deputies' 
grievance was untimely. The trial court remanded the 
case to the Council for the entry of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law consistent with its June 30, 1997 
ruling. The Council never complied with the remand 
order. n3 Finally, after briefing and oral argument, on 
September 27, 2001, the trial court found the deputies' 
claims untimely as a matter of law. The deputies now 
appeal that decision. 
n3 All three original Council members were 
no longer on the Council. Thus, the new Council 
members were not well-suited to comply with the 
remand order. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P7] The deputies challenge the trial court's reversal of 
the Council's determination that the deputies' grievance 
petition was timely. Because the County brought its trial 
court petition under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, [HN1] "this court looks 1***6] at the 
administrative proceeding as if the petition were brought 
here directly, even though technically it is the [trial] 
court's decision that is being appealed." Tolman v. Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). "We give no deference to the [trial] court's initial 
appellate review since it was a review of the record, 
which this court is just as capable of reviewing as the 
district court." Id. 
[*P8] Rule 65B [HN2] provides, in part, "Where no 
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, [ n4 
] a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief. 
. . . where an . . . administrative agency . . . has . . . 
abused its discretion." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a), (d)(2)(A). 
A rule 65B abuse of discretion hinges on whether the 
Council "misused" or "exceeded" its discretion. Tolman, 
818 P.2d at 27 (citations omitted). "However, as noted 
by both this court and the Utah Supreme Court, 'abuse of 
discretion' for rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writs must be much 
more blatant than the garden variety 'abuse of discretion' 
featured in routine appellate review." State v. Stirba, 972 
P.2d 918, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) [***7] (citing Renn 
v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 
1995)). For example, in Stirba, this court found that a 
"simple mistake of law does not qualify as the kind of 
gross and flagrant abuse of discretion necessary for a rule 
65B(d)(2)(A) writ to issue." n5 Id. at 923. Thus, we will 
reverse the Council's legal conclusion regarding its 
timeliness rule only if it is a gross and flagrant abuse of 
discretion. We review any underlying factual findings 
under a clearly erroneous standard. See Mule-Hide 
Prods. Co. v. White, 2002 UT App 1, Pll, 40 P.3d 1155. 
n4 The Utah Legislature amended Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-33-4 in 2001 by adding a procedure 
for appeals of Council decisions to the trial 
courts, see id. at § 17-33-4(1)(d) (2001) 
(amendment notes), but this was not in effect in 
1997 when the County first petitioned for an 
extraordinary writ. 
n5 The County argues this court's rule 65B 
abuse of discretion analysis in State v. Stirba, 
972 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), applies only 
to cases where an appeal is statutorily prohibited. 
We disagree. In Stirba, this court separately 
discussed a statutory limit placed on the State's 
right to appeal. See id. at 923. Further, we cited 
Indian Vill Trading Post, Inc. v. Bench, 929 P.2d 
367 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) in support of our rule 
65B abuse of discretion analysis. See Stirba, 972 
P.2d at 923. Bench did not involve a statutory 
limit of appeal. See 929 P.2d at 370 (discussing 
use of rule 65B to "compel correction of a public 
officer's gross abuse of discretion" (emphasis 
added)). 
* * * o i 
ANALYSIS 
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[*P9] The County argues the Council misapplied its 
timeliness rule for hearing appeals. [HN3] Section VII 
E.l of the Utah County Office of Personnel Management 
Rules and Regulations provides, "Any career service 
employee who has completed a . . . probationary period . 
. . having a grievance over merit principles may appeal to 
the Career Service Council. The employee must file a 
written notice with the personnel director within three 
months from the date of the occurrence." Here, the 
Council concluded that the deputies' "discussion with 
Sheriff Bateman in December, 1996 [**624] was the 
date that should drive the time for filing," and that 
because the deputies "filed within 90 days of that date," 
their petition was timely. 
[*P10] Implicit in this determination is a factual finding 
that the deputies were not reasonably aware of their 
grievance until their December 1996 discussion with the 
sheriff. The deputies first learned in December 1996 that 
Sheriff Bateman erroneously believed the position of 
shift supervisor "was never a ranked position." Prior to 
December 1996, the deputies did not know, and had no 
reason to know, of the possibility that they were 
personally passed [***9] over for promotion because of 
an incorrect assumption regarding their qualifications. 
Thus, the Council's implicit factual finding was not 
clearly erroneous. n6 
n6 [HN4] Although lower tribunals should 
make explicit factual findings, the '"failure to 
make factual findings is not reversible error'" 
where, as here, "the facts in the record are 'clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment.'" American 
Fork City v. Singleton, 2002 UT App 331, P8, 57 
P.3d 1124 (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 
996, 999 (Utah 1987)). Here, the County does not 
dispute that, in December 1996, the deputies first 
learned of the sheriffs erroneous assumption 
regarding the status of the shift supervisor 
position. 
Furthermore, any remand to the Council for 
factual findings would not be helpful in this case. 
The trial court unsuccessfully attempted such a 
remand, and the Council members who sat on this 
case are no longer available or with the Council. 
[*P11] [***10] Moreover, because the Council had 
reason to believe the deputies were not reasonably aware 
of their employment grievance until December 1996, the 
Council did not grossly and flagrantly abuse its 
discretion in concluding, as a matter of law, that the 
grievance's "date of. . . occurrence" was in December 
1996. Therefore, the Council's legal conclusion that the 
deputies' grievance was timely was not a gross and 
flagrant abuse of discretion. n7 
n7 Furthermore, even if the Council 
technically deviated from its rule, it was still 
within rule 65B parameters. Cf. Union Pac. R.R. 
Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d at 876, 
879 (Utah 1992), superceded on other grounds, 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b) (Supp. 1993) 
(concluding appellate courts should "uphold 
reasonable and rational departures" from an 
agency's own rules, "absent a showing that the 
departure violated some other right" (emphasis 
added)). The Council must be "in sympathy with 
the application of merit principles" to career 
service employment, Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-
4(l)(a)(i), and the three month timeliness 
requirement stems from a procedural and internal 
personnel rule. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-10 
(2001). Given the deputies' new information and 
the Council's finding that the Department's 
promotions were arbitrary, the Council could 
have equitably decided to slightly deviate from its 
timeliness rule. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P12] We conclude the Council did not grossly and 
flagrantly abuse its discretion in allowing the deputies' 
appeal under its timeliness rule. We therefore reverse the 
trial court's ruling. n8 
n8 At oral argument, the County urged us to 
alternatively remand this case to the trial court for 
findings on the merits. However, in its 
memorandum decision reversing the Council's 
timeliness decision, the trial court clearly upheld 
the Council's conclusions on the merits, and the 
County has filed no cross appeal. Specifically, the 
trial court stated, "This court is persuaded that 
there is sufficient evidence to support [the 
deputies'] claim that the County deviated from a 
regular process of promotion based on merit 
principles. Therefore, the finding of the Council 
on this issue will not be overturned." 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
[*P13] WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Presiding Judge James Z. Davis, Judge 
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CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: In an original proceeding, 
petitioner state sought a writ of mandamus under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65 to compel respondent judge to order more 
comprehensive restitution to the victims of intervenor 
criminal. Respondent, in sentencing intervenor, had 
ordered intervenor to make restitution of out-of-pocket 
losses, but had declined to apply the collateral source 
rule and to order restitution to the victims of sums paid 
by their insurers. 
OVERVIEW: Respondent judge convicted intervenor 
criminal and ordered restitution to the victims of their 
out-of-pocket losses, but declined to use the collateral 
source rule to make higher restitution for losses 
supposedly inadequately covered by insurance. Petitioner 
state, which had no right of appeal, sought a writ to 
compel the judge to order the higher restitution. The 
court denied the relief, and held that respondent had 
fulfilled her duty by ordering restitution under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (1998). The court held that 
while a writ could issue for an abuse of discretion, a 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65(B)(d)(2)(B) writ could not direct how 
the discretion was to be exercised. The court held that it 
could use a Utah R. Civ. P. 65(B)(d)(2)(A) writ to 
correct and redirect an abuse of discretion, but that such 
an abuse would have to be far more serious than the 
abuse of discretion usually seen on appeal. The court 
declined to use the writ as a substitute for an 
unauthorized appeal by the state because even if there 
was an error of law, as it appeared here, such an error 
was not the type of serious abuse of discretion for which 
a writ would issue. 
OUTCOME: The court declined to issue the requested 
writ of mandamus because the judge had performed the 
duty of ordering restitution, even if it was not in the 
manner desired by petitioner state. The court held a writ 
was not to be used as a substitute for an unauthorized 
appeal by the state and would not issue without a 
grievous abuse of discretion even if there was an error of 
law by the trial judge. 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Right to 
Appeal > Defendant 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Extraordinary 
Writs 
[HN1] A petition for mandamus is an original 
proceeding, not an appeal from respondent judge's 
restitution order. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1(2) (1998) 
precludes the state from appealing this order and the state 
may not use the writ of mandamus to circumvent this 
restriction. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of 
Review > Standards Generally 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Extraordinary 
Writs 
[HN2] The extraordinary writs do not authorize appellate 
courts to exercise the same scope of review as may be 
exercised pursuant to statutory appeals. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Right to 
Appeal > Defendant 
[HN3] See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (1998). 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of 
Review > Standards Generally 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Extraordinary 
Writs 
[HN4] Because the state challenges a judicial decision, 
the court's review shall not extend further than to 
determine whether respondent judge has regularly 
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pursued her authority. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(4). 
However, in making this determination, since the issue 
here involves the interpretation and application of a 
statute, the trial court's legal conclusion is granted no 
particular deference but is reviewed for correctness. 
While the court limits the review of the judge's actions to 
deciding whether the judge has regularly exercised her 
authority, the court grants no deference to the judge in 
the interpretation and application of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-201 (1997). 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Extraordinary 
Writs 
[HN5] The court may grant the extraordinary relief of a 
writ in the nature of mandamus, compelling a lower 
court's compliance, when the lower court has (A) 
exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) 
failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of 
office, trust or station; or (C) refused the petitioner the 
use or enjoyment of a right or office to which the 
petitioner is entitled. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2). 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Extraordinary 
Writs 
[HN6] The granting a writ of mandamus is always a 
matter of discretion with the court and never a matter of 
right on behalf of the applicant. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Extraordinary 
Writs 
[HN7] The court may not exercise its discretion and 
enter a Utah R. Civ. P. 65B writ unless the state has no 
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Sentencing > Restitution 
[HN8] The state's right to pursue criminal restitution 
cannot be equated with the victim's right to pursue civil 
damages. A key purpose of restitution is to spare victims 
the time, expense, and emotional difficulties of separate 
civil litigation to recover their damages from the 
defendant. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Extraordinary 
Writs 
[HN9] A writ under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(B) is 
available to direct the exercise of discretionary action, 
but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in 
a particular way. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Extraordinary 
Writs 
[HN10] While it is well-settled that mandamus may not 
issue to compel a public official with unlimited 
discretion to act in a certain way, courts have long 
recognized that where the law imposes limitations on the 
exercise of that discretion, mandamus is available to 
enforce those limitations. Such limitations are only 
enforced against the overstepping of statutory authority. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Sentencing > Restitution 
[HN11] Utah's restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-201(4)(a)(i) (1998), provides that when a person is 
convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, the court shall order that the defendant 
make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this 
subsection. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Sentencing > Restitution 
[HN12] See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (1998). 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Sentencing > Restitution 
[HN13] See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(8) (1998). 
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Writs 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of 
Review > Abuse of Discretion 
[HN14] Although Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(B) does not 
permit the court to do so, Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(A) 
allows the court to direct the particular exercise of a 
lower court's judgment to correct the lower court's abuse 
of discretion. However, abuse of discretion for 
mandamus writs must be much more blatant than the 
garden variety abuse of discretion featured in routine 
appellate review. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Extraordinary 
Writs 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of 
Review > Abuse of Discretion 
[HN15] A simple mistake of law does not qualify as the 
kind of gross and flagrant abuse of discretion necessary 
for a Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(A) writ to issue. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Extraordinary 
Writs 
[HN16] While courts may find an abuse of discretion and 
issue a Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(A) writ in the face of a 
particularly egregious and momentous legal error, the 
courts may not routinely use the writ as a substitute for 
an appeal. 
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JUDGES: Gregory K. Orme, Judge. WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge. Judith M. Billings, Judge. 
OPINIONBY: Gregory K. Orme 
OPINION: [*919] OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, petitioner, the State of Utah, requests an 
extraordinary writ compelling respondent, Anne M. 
Stirba, District Court Judge, to order restitution which 
she previously held unrecoverable. For what are 
essentially procedural reasons, we deny the petition. 
BACKGROUND 
In the underlying case, State v. Morrison, Third 
District Court No. 971900099FS, the State filed an 
information against Laura M. Morrison, the intervenor 
herein, charging her with, inter alia, theft by receiving 
stolen property, a second degree felony in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. [**2] § 76-6-408 (1995), for her role 
in a motor vehicle theft. A jury convicted Morrison of 
this offense and Judge Stirba ordered counsel for 
Morrison and the State to submit briefs regarding the 
amount of restitution that Morrison should pay her 
victims, a married couple. 
In response, the State filed a brief requesting an 
order requiring Morrison to pay the victims $ 250 to 
recompense them for an insurance deductible they had 
paid. Additionally, the State requested that Judge Stirba 
order Morrison to pay the victims $ 9312.50 to cover 
their vehicle's value. According to the State 
—although the premise is surely questionable—the 
victims had received an insurance settlement for this 
amount, but their policy required them to repay it 
because their vehicle~or what was left of it-was 
recovered. At a restitution hearing held on September 2, 
1997, one of the victims testified that she and her 
husband had saved for years to buy the vehicle, which 
was "totaled" when the police recovered it from 
Morrison. After settling with their insurance company 
and car loan lender, the victim testified that they could 
not afford a down payment on a new vehicle. The State 
argued that, notwithstanding [**3] their insurance 
coverage, the victims were entitled to receive the $ 
9312.50 from Morrison under the collateral source rule. 
Judge Stirba ordered Morrison to pay the victims $ 
250 for their insurance deductible and $ 500 for their car 
stereo, which was apparently excluded from insurance 
coverage. Additionally, Judge Stirba took the issue of 
whether Morrison should be required to pay amounts 
duplicative of those covered [*920] by insurance under 
advisement, pending briefing by counsel for both sides 
on the collateral source doctrine and other applicable 
law. 
On October 22, 1997, Judge Stirba entered a 
memorandum decision denying the State's request for 
restitution covering losses for which the victims were 
insured. Judge Stirba ruled that, under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-201 (4) (a) (i) (Supp. 1997), as interpreted by this 
court's decision in State v. Westerman, 945 P.2d 695 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), "a defendant cannot be required to 
pay restitution . . . to a victim who has already been 
reimbursed by the victim's insurance carrier." 
Challenging this ruling, the State filed a Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ in this court, seeking a writ, in the 
nature of mandamus, directing Judge Stirba to order 
[**4] Morrison to pay the victims the $ 9312.50 value of 
their car, even though that amount was covered by their 
insurance. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Nature of relief sought and standard of review 
At the outset, it is important to note that [HN1] this case 
comes to us as an original proceeding, not an appeal 
from Judge Stirba's restitution order. In fact, Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18a-1(2) (Supp. 1998) precludes the State 
from appealing this order, nl and the State may not use 
the writ of mandamus to circumvent this restriction. See 
Petersen v. Utah State Ed. of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148, 
1152 (Utah 1995) [HN2] ("The extraordinary writs do 
not, however, authorize [appellate courts] to exercise the 
same scope of review as may be exercised pursuant to 
statutory appeals."); Merrihew v. Salt Lake County 
Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 
(Utah 1983) ('"A writ of mandamus is not a substitute for 
and cannot be used in civil proceedings to serve the 
purpose of appeal . . . .'") (quoting Crist v. Mapleton 
City, 28 Utah 2d 7, 9, 497 P.2d 633, 634 (1972)). 
nl [HN3] Section 77-18a-l(2) sets forth 
specific judgments and orders from which the 
State may appeal in criminal cases: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a 
dismissal of a felony information following a 
refusal to bind the defendant over for trial; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution 
because of a finding of double jeopardy or denial 
of a speedy trial; 
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(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute 
or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial 
motion to suppress evidence when upon a petition 
for review the appellate court decides that the 
appeal would be in the interest of justice; 
(f) under circumstances not amounting to a 
final order under subsection (2)(a), a refusal to 
bind the defendant over for trial on a felony as 
charged or a pretrial order dismissing or quashing 
in part a felony information, when upon a petition 
for review the appellate court decides that the 
appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(g) an order of the court granting a motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (Supp. 1998). 
None of these types of judgments or orders are 
present here. Moreover, section 77-18a-1(2) is 
restrictive rather than permissive and, thus, the 
State has no right to appeal except as expressly 
provided therein. See State v. Waddoups, 712 
P. 2d 223, 224 (Utah 1985); State v. Kelbach, 569 
P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1977); State v. Workman, 
806 P.2d 1198, 1201-02 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
aff d, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993). 
[**5] 
Accordingly, [HN4] because the State challenges a 
judicial decision, our review "shall not extend further 
than to determine whether [Judge Stirba] has regularly 
pursued [her] authority." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(4). 
However, in making this determination, "since the issue 
here involves the interpretation and application of a 
statute, the trial court's legal conclusion is granted no 
particular deference but is reviewed for correctness." Salt 
Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 
890 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1995). In other words, while 
we limit our review of Judge Stirba's actions to deciding 
whether she has regularly exercised her authority, we 
grant no deference to her interpretation and application 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1997). See id. at 
1019. 
[HN5] We may n2 grant the extraordinary relief of 
a writ in the nature of mandamus, compelling [*921] a 
lower court's compliance, when the lower court has 
n2 " [HN6] 'The granting a writ [of 
mandamus] is always a matter of discretion with 
this court and never a matter of right on behalf of 
the applicant.'" Renn v. Utah State Bd. of 
Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995) 
(quoting State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 220, 
429 P.2d 969, 971 (1967)) (alterations in 
original). 
[**6] 
(A) . . . exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its 
discretion; (B) . . . failed to perform an act required by 
law as a duty of office, trust or station; [or] (C) . . . 
refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or 
office to which the petitioner is entitled. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2). In this case, the State 
contends Judge Stirba failed to perform a legally 
required act under Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) and abused her 
discretion under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A). In assessing these 
contentions, and in deciding whether to issue the writ, we 
"must look to the nature of the relief sought, the 
circumstances alleged in the petition, and the purpose of 
the type of writ sought." Renn, 904 P.2d at 683. 
However, [HN7] we may not exercise our 
discretion and enter a Rule 65B writ unless the State has 
"no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy" at law. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). Thus, we must first determine 
whether the State could obtain clear, sufficient and 
expedient relief by means other than a Rule 65B action. 
B. Absence of other plain, speedy, and adequate 
remedy 
When it cannot appeal a district court's order, a petitioner 
has "no alternative course to follow" and thus Rule 65B 
"provides [**7] the [petitioner] with its sole means to 
obtain a 'plain, speedy and adequate remedy' for the 
district court's alleged abuse of discretion." Society of 
Prof I Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1168 n.l 
(Utah 1987) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a)). As noted 
earlier in this opinion, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1(2) 
(Supp. 1998) precludes the State from appealing Judge 
Stirba's restitution order. See supra note 1 and 
accompanying text. Consequently, the State has no other 
course to follow in challenging this order, and Rule 65B 
provides the State with its sole means to obtain a plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy. 
Morrison argues that, because the victims may 
pursue a civil action against her, an alternative remedy 
exists and a Rule 65B writ is inappropriate. We disagree. 
[HN8] The State's right to pursue criminal restitution 
cannot be equated with the victim's right to pursue civil 
damages. Cf. Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1027 
(Utah 1996) (noting key purpose of restitution "is to 
spare victims the time, expense, and emotional 
difficulties of separate civil litigation to recover their 
damages from the defendant"). Moreover, the victims are 
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not parties to this action and [**8] the remedies 
available to them have no bearing on whether a Rule 65B 
writ is the State's only viable remedy. 
We thus conclude a Rule 65B extraordinary writ is 
the State's only plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 
Having reached this conclusion, we consider the State's 
claim that Judge Stirba failed to perform a legal duty of 
her office. 
C. Failure to perform an act required by law under 
Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) 
[HN9] A Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) writ is available to 
direct the exercise of discretionary action, '""but not to 
direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a 
particular way.'"" Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 
P.2d 677, 682 (Utah 1995) (quoting State v. Ruggeri, 19 
Utah 2d 216, 218, 429 P.2d 969, 970 (1967) (quoting 34 
Am. Jur. Mandamus § 4 (1941))). For instance, if a 
lower court refused to rule on a timely and proper 
motion, we could compel it to do so, but we could not 
direct it how to rule. See Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d at 218, 
429 P.2d at 970. However, 
[HN10] 
while it is well settled that mandamus may not issue to 
compel a public official with unlimited discretion to act 
in a certain way, courts have long recognized that where 
the law imposes limitations on the exercise [**9] of that 
discretion, mandamus is available to enforce those 
limitations. 
Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. DisL, 724 P.2d 960, 967 
(Utah 1986). Utah courts have thus far only enforced 
such limitations against the overstepping of "statutory 
authority." Id. In this case, Judge Stirba has performed 
the acts required of her office without overstepping 
statutory limitations. 
[HN11] Utah's restitution statute provides that 
"when a person is convicted of criminal activity that has 
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other 
sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant [*922] make restitution to victims of crime as 
provided in this subsection." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, upon Morrison's conviction, section 76-3-
201(4)(a)(i) imposed a nondiscretionary duty upon Judge 
Stirba to order Morrison to make appropriate restitution. 
Judge Stirba performed this duty by entering an 
order of restitution recompensing Morrison's victims for 
the value of their insurance deductible and their car 
stereo. Judge Stirba's refusal to perform this duty in a 
particular way, by including amounts previously paid by 
insurance, does [**10] not constitute a failure to 
perform a legally required act for purposes of Rule 
65B(d)(2)(B). Moreover, Judge Stirba has not 
overstepped any statutory limitations on the exercise of 
her duties under the restitution statute. While the 
restitution statute requires trial courts to follow specific 
"criteria and procedures" in determining the propriety 
and amount of restitution, n3 none of these standards 
relate to whether trial courts may include losses covered 
by insurance. Id. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(ii). 
n3 [HN12] The criteria and procedures 
governing restitution orders are as follows: 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall 
determine complete restitution and court-ordered 
restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution 
necessary to compensate a victim for all losses 
caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the 
restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction 
orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-
ordered restitution shall be determined as 
provided in Subsection (8). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (Supp. 1998). 
[HN13] The referenced subsection (8) gives 
the trial court detailed guidance concerning 
restitution determinations: 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and 
other conditions for complete restitution, the 
court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the 
offense resulted in damage to or loss or 
destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related 
professional services and devices relating to 
physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment 
rendered in accordance with a method of healing 
recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational 
therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by 
the victim as a result of the offense if the offense 
resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related 
services if the offense resulted in the death of a 
victim. 
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(c) In determining the monetary sum and 
other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the 
court shall consider the factors listed in 
Subsection (8)(b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant 
and the burden that payment of restitution will 
impose, with regard to the other obligations of the 
defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay 
restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant 
of the payment of restitution and the method of 
payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court 
determines make restitution inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order 
or may defer entering an order of restitution if the 
court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result 
of considering an order of restitution under this 
subsection, substantially outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to the victim. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(8) (Supp. 1998). 
[**11] 
Hence, Judge Stirba has not "failed to perform an act 
required by law as a duty of office, trust or station" under 
Rule 65B(d)(2)(B), and we cannot grant the State's 
request for extraordinary relief under this provision. 
D. Abuse of discretion under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) 
[HN14] Although Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) does not 
permit us to do so, Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) allows us to direct 
the particular exercise of a lower court's judgment to 
correct the lower court's abuse of discretion. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(A); Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy 
Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1019-22 (Utah 
1995). However, as noted by both this court and the Utah 
Supreme Court, "abuse of discretion" for Rule 
65B(d)(2)(A) writs must be much more blatant than the 
garden variety "abuse of discretion" featured in routine 
appellate review. See Renn, 904 P. 2d at 683 (holding 
courts may employ Rule 65B writ to correct a "gross and 
flagrant abuse of discretion") [*923] (emphasis added); 
Indian Village Trading Post, Inc. v. Bench, 929 P. 2d 
367, 370 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("Thus, under Rule 65B[], 
a petitioner may seek to . . . compel correction of a 
public officer's gross abuse of discretion [under] [**12] 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B[(d)](2)(A).") (citation omitted; 
emphasis added). 
In this case, Judge Stirba's ruling that "a defendant 
cannot be required to pay restitution . . . to a victim who 
has already been reimbursed by the victim's insurance 
carrier" was an incorrect interpretation of the restitution 
statute then in effect. n4 However, [HN15] a simple 
mistake of law does not qualify as 
n4 Judge Stirba based her ruling on this 
court's holding in State v. Westerman, 945 P.2d 
695 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), that "an insurance 
company is not a victim as defined in [the 
restitution statute]" and therefore not entitled to 
restitution payments. Id. at 699. However, the 
restitution statute applicable when Judge Stirba 
entered her ruling provided that "for purposes of 
restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in 
Section 77-38-2," Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1997), which section defined 
"victim" as any natural person against whom the 
charged crime or conduct is alleged to have been 
perpetrated or attempted by the defendant or 
minor personally or as a party to the offense or 
conduct, or, in the discretion of the court, against 
whom a related crime or act is alleged to have 
been perpetrated or attempted. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(9)(a) (Supp. 1997). 
Acknowledging that "the result is troublesome," 
the Westerman court held that an insurance 
company does not fall within this definition of 
"victim." 945 P.2d at 699. However, the 
restitution order challenged in Westerman was an 
order mandating payment of restitution directly to 
the victim's insurer. See id. at 696. 
In stark contrast, the restitution sought by the 
State in this case was to be paid directly to the 
victim. As we noted in State v. Haga, 954 P.2d 
1284, 1289 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), Westerman has 
no application absent an order specifically 
requiring that the defendant pay restitution 
directly to an insurance company. Accordingly, 
because the restitution recipient in this case was 
to be the very persons against whom the charged 
crime was perpetrated, and not an insurer, Judge 
Stirba misapplied the Westerman holding in 
interpreting the restitution statute. 
We also note that the Legislature has 
addressed the substantive issue in this case, i.e., 
the propriety of restitution orders for amounts 
covered by a victim's insurance. Following the 
Westerman ruling, the Legislature took the 
Westerman court up on its suggestion to "enact 
remedial legislation," 945 P.2d at 695 n.5, 
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dealing with any unintended effects of that 
decision. See 1998 Utah Laws ch. 149, § 1. 
Hence, effective May 4, 1998, the restitution 
statute defines "victim" as "any person whom the 
court determines has suffered pecuniary damages 
as a result of the defendant's criminal activities." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (l)(e)(i) (Supp. 
1998). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) 
(a)(i) (Supp. 1998). Because this definition is far 
less restrictive than the definition considered in 
Westerman and certainly broad enough to include 
insurance companies, the Legislature's 1998 
amendment has effectively superseded the 
Westerman decision. 
[**13] 
the kind of gross and flagrant abuse of discretion 
necessary for a Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ to issue. 
Moreover, [HN16] while courts may find an abuse 
of discretion and issue a Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ in the 
face of a particularly egregious and momentous legal 
error, see, e.g., Frederick, 890 P.2d at 1019-21, the 
courts may not routinely use the writ as a substitute for 
an appeal. See Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning 
and Zoning Comm'n, 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1983). 
The Legislature has exactingly limited the judgments and 
orders from which the State may appeal in criminal 
cases, none of which include restitution orders. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (Supp. 1998). Although the 
State brings its Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) claim as an original 
action, this proceeding has the same characteristics, and 
seeks the same review and relief, as would a statutory 
appeal from Judge Stirba's restitution order. Hence, to 
avoid transforming this action into an impermissible 
appeal, we must deny the State's request for a Rule 
65B(d)(2)(A) writ of mandamus. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on our determination that Judge Stirba neither 
failed to perform a legally-required act under Rule 
65B(d)(2)(B) [**14] nor abused her discretion under 
Rule 65B(d)(2)(A), coupled with our holding that the 
State's action is tantamount to an impermissible appeal, 
the State's Petition for Extraordinary Writ is hereby 
denied. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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JUDD personally and as the natural paieni 
and guardian of ATHAN MONTGOMERY 
for and on behalf of ATHAN 
MONTGOMERY. 
Defendants. 
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Judge Leslie Lewis 
This present matter concerning the appointment of counsel to represent Defendant 
Drezga consistent with the prior order of this court came on regularly before the court for 
hearing on tiie ~ ; • c^\ MJIC;.. ...••. . ....:.'.:' he Doctor :. v ompany was represented by Jaryl 
Rencher. Defendant Montgomery was represented by James W. McConkie and Bradley H. 
/*:ii: .- • ! <- • . . • ins uient, weiei.iiai:: . ,i. . doctors' Company, noted for 
the record, as he previousiy briefed and argued in prior hearings before the court, his objection to 
the appointment of ai i>< counsel , bi it indicated i 10 additional personal objection to the 
appointment of attorney Paul Burke. Attorney Rencher represented, to the court that The 
Doctor's Compan) had com mi inicated tc • him that' Hie Doctoi 's Company would not pay the 
attorney's fees of the court appointed counsel even if ordered by the court to do so and attorney 
Rench-r Tvun-'-ii-H thai an\ appomled cniniM'l he M I mimmcd. 
Having heard the arguments and representations of counsel, upon the pleadings on file 
herein, upon and consistent with the past orders of the coir iy informed of the 
premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Paul Burke, of the law (inn ofk'iv, Uuinney HIM 1 Nebeker he am' lirivhv i > 
appointed as counsel for Defendant Drezga, and that 
2. Defendant The Doctor's Companv. rnnsislent with pihn onlei of" the coin I, pa/ 
the attorneys fees of Paul Burke for his representation of Defendant Drezga. 
f/P^,. .,.-— •, ,- ^ 
SO ORDERED this-4 ' l iay of March, 2003,
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